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violence and its analysis, is the longest way round, tracing the edge sideways like the crab scuttling.” 
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Summary 
 
In this thesis, Violent Silence – Guatemalan narratives of suffering, I focus upon two reports carried 
out by the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) and the Recovery of 
Historical Memory project (REMHI) or what is more commonly known as truth commissions.  
In the main argument of the thesis, I question how the two truth commissions can be 
understood as actors in the space of post-conflict state formation in Guatemala.  
However, before embarking into such a discussion I have chosen to introduce an analytical 
framework in which I provide perspectives on the work of truth commissions, as well as 
discussions on notions related to the subject. In addition to this framework I present an 
introduction to the conflict in Guatemala. By doing so, I hope to have provided for an 
understanding of truth commissions and the context in which such bodies operates. With these 
chapters serving as a point of departure, I present an analysis in which I try to illustrate and 
discuss how these commissions are able to produce a set of narratives, as well as 
recommendations and conclusions that actively oppose the violence of the past and the regime 
behind it.  
What I am suggesting is that these two commissions can be thought to be dealing not only with 
the past but just as much with the present. Furthermore, given the nature of the two truth 
commissions, one of the most important questions of the thesis, and the analysis, concerns the 
very character of the set of narratives produced by the two commissions – what is it that the 
testimonies are recounting and how are they actually transformed into a set of narratives? In 
this regard, the analysis focus upon the notion of silence – questioning: If not silence can be 
thought to have an additional characteristic – a kind of violent trait? By posing this question, I 
focus upon the complicated relationship between violence and silence – and in doing so I ask: 
If not the two truth commissions are dealing with a violence that is as much a part of the 
present as it is of the past? 
Consequently, I end up arguing that it is especially through their narration, and the character of 
these narratives, that I find it is possible to think of the CEH and the REMHI as actors in a 
space of post-conflict state formation that not only tries to shed light on the past but are 
actually opposing a persisting syndrome of the conflict in Guatemala. 
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Foreword 
 
The institutions known as truth commissions operate in the aftermath of conflict and are 
primarily initiated with the intention to shed light on an often blurred past in a given post-
conflict society. These commissions are actors in the same environment as post-conflict crime 
tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) or the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). However, although they operate and 
engage in related efforts, they are still very different actors.  
The first truth commission appeared in Uganda in 1974 and were followed by others up 
through the 1980’s e.g. the Argentinean National Commission on the Disappearance of 
Persons and the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation. However, these 
bodies of official truth-seeking especially gained precedence in the beginning of the 1990’s e.g. 
with the well-known South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  
This turn towards truth-seeking also seems to have been affected by the end of the Cold War 
and the new political agendas that surfaced as a consequence of this event. And while some 
observers proclaimed that it was the end of history1, it seems that this period actually re-
introduced history on the political scene e.g. as seen with the outbreak of ethnic conflicts or 
through efforts that confronted the past. As a result, the phenomena of truth-seeking can be 
thought to be intimately, although not solely, connected to the post-Cold War era.  
However, the question that I find to be of interest is if these efforts do not actually go beyond 
shedding light on the past. And it is from such a perspective, that this thesis, which is an 
integrated study between the two subjects International Development Studies and History, 
focuses on the two truth commissions of Guatemala, the Guatemalan Commission for 
Historical Clarification (CEH) and the Recovery of Historical Memory project (REMHI).  
In doing so, I introduce an analytical framework in which complementing insights and 
perspectives, from the aforementioned academic traditions, on the subject are presented. And 
from thereon I embark into an analysis, by which I hope that it will be possible to better 
understand these two commissions as what I believe they really are – as actors in the space of 
post-conflict state formation in Guatemala. 
                                            
1 Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History? The National Interest, 16, Summer 1989. pp. 3-18. 
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1. “No Comments” 
 
On 25th of February 1999, the report Guatemala: Memory of Silence2 was released in Guatemala 
City’s National Theater. Present were all the victims and survivors, as well as their relatives, 
whose stories filled the pages of the report. Also present, were the members of national and 
international human rights organisations and not least Guatemala’s President Alvaro Arzú and 
his close advisors and military officers.3  
The conclusions of the United Nations-administered Guatemalan Commission for Historical 
Clarification (CEH4) were greeted with great applause, all the while, President Arzú and the 
government officials appeared to be stunned. No one had expected that what had been silenced 
would be publicly named5, it was a scenario in which: “The jungle crouched, humped in silence. Then 
spoke the thunder”6 or rather the jungle had crouched, had humped in silence – and now the 
thunder spoke. In the clamour of this thunder, President Arzú delegated Raquel Zelaya, the 
government’s secretary of peace, to the stage and thus did not, as it had been intended, 
personally receive the CEH report. After the presentation he exited through a backdoor – with 
no comments.7 
Before the release of this thunder, a nearly 36 year long conflict had raged 
throughout Guatemala until ending the 29th of December 1996, when the Government of the 
Republic of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) signed 
the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace.8  
However, before this final agreement was signed, a nearly ten year long period of peace 
negotiations had taken place. The first fragile signs of contact between the URNG and the 
Government of the Republic of Guatemala took place after the signing of the Procedure for 
the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America in Guatemala City on the 7th 
                                            
2 Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala: Memory of Silence; Report of the Commission for 
Historical Clarification, Conclusions and Recommendations. See 
http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html and http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/mds/spanish 
3 Grandin, Greg. Chronicles of a Guatemalan Genocide Foretold. Violence, Trauma, and the Limits of Historical Inquiry. 
Nepantla: Views from South 1:2. Duke University Press. 2000. pp. 391-412.   
4 After its Spanish abbreviation: Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, CEH. 
5 González, Matilde. The Man Who Brought the Danger to the Village: Representations of the Armed Conflict in 
Guatemala from a Local Perspective. Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 26, Number 2, June 2000, pp. 317-335 
6 Eliot, Thomas Stearns. The Waste Land and Other Poems. New York. Published by Barnes and Noble Classics. 2005. p.80   
7 Grandin, Greg. Chronicles of a Guatemalan Genocide Foretold. Violence, Trauma, and the Limits of Historical Inquiry. 
Nepantla: Views from South 1:2. Duke University Press. 2000. pp. 391-412.   
8 Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace. See http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/guatemala/firm-lasting-peace.php 
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of August 1987, also better known as the “Esquipulas II” Accord. This agreement established 
the National Reconciliation Commission (CNR) which came to play a central role in the 
negotiations.9 In 1988, the Catholic Church of Guatemala also issued a call for a national 
dialogue on peace, and meetings between the URNG and the CNR were held under the 
observation of the United Nations.  
In January to February 1990, the government announced that it was willing to meet with the 
URNG and the Catholic Bishop of Zacapa, Monsignor Rodolfo Quezada Toruño was invited, 
as the “official conciliator”, together with the UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, 
who observed the dialogue.10 Following this meeting, the URNG met with members of the 
CNR in Norway and signed The Basic Agreement on the Search for Peace by Political Means, 
the so-called “Oslo Accord”, on 30th of March 1990. This agreement, amongst other things, 
confirmed a future dialogue between the URNG and the government, as well as, it confirmed 
the invitation for UN monitoring of the peace process.11 From this time and on, several 
meetings and agreements were signed (See Chart 1: Agreements signed as a part of the Peace Process in 
Guatemala 1987-96), however, the disputes between the URNG and the government continued 
and this finally led to a stalemate in the negotiations. In the following period, between January-
March 1993, both the government and URNG brought forth their own new peace plan while 
rejecting the one presented by the opposing party.12 
In 1994, with encouragement from the United States of America, the European Union and 
Mexico, the negotiations were resumed and eventually led to the signing of several agreements 
in the years 1994-96, not least The Agreement for the Establishment of the Commission to 
Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan 
Population to Suffer – this agreement later led to the establishing of the CEH commission, and 
it was these accords that finally succeeded in clearing the way for the final peace agreement (See 
Chart 1: Agreements signed as a part of the Peace Process in Guatemala 1987-96).  
The Peace Accords stated that this agreement ended a period of pain and sorrow 
but, just as important, it situated the Guatemalan society on the brink of a new era, in which, 
each and every individual faced the task of preserving and consolidating the newly gained 
                                            
9 http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/guatemala/chronology.php 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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peace. Nevertheless, it seems that the end of the war merely introduced a new struggle or as it 
has been more sharply stated: “… the peace accords ended one war and began another – a war over the 
past, and therefore the future.”13  
However, the harsh fact is that Guatemala: Memory of Silence seems to have generated a relatively 
little amount of debate.14 Thus a discrepancy exists between this climax of the CEH, the 
presentation of its report, and the reactions of the actors and structure that it above all targeted, 
or as it has been stated: “Official responses to the report and the genocide charge have been disappointing (...) 
the Guatemalan government has not claimed the CEH report as its own.”15  
Indeed, the Guatemalan government proved to be more than reluctant to accept the findings of 
the report and in the days after the presentation President Arzú begged for time to “”read, 
analyze, and study in meticulous detail each and every word””16 – President Arzú never issued an official 
response, however, he later rejected the genocide argument of the CEH: “”Genocide is the desire to 
exterminate an ethnic group, and this was not the cause of the conflict””.17 A statement that was as 
destructive as the one put forth by secretary of peace Raquel Zelaya, immediately after the 
presentation, where he stated that it should be kept in mind that: “”those responsible for the 
massacres will not be brought to justice””18 Adding to this havoc the minister of defence, General 
Héctor Barrios, remarked that the report was merely: “”a partial truth, since its version of history is 
nothing more than the point of view of the commission””19 
The immediate paradox is therefore that Guatemala: Memory of Silence, although it seemingly 
brought the release of the past, was met with another form of silence – that of the government 
and its officials. The struggle is thus situated around the past, or more precisely, around the 
effort to secure the acknowledgement and recognition of the numerous atrocities which were 
                                            
13 Smith, Patrick. Memory without History: Who Owns Guatemala’s Past? The Washinton Quarterly, Spring 2001. p.61 
14 Grandin, Greg. Chronicles of a Guatemalan Genocide Foretold. Violence, Trauma, and the Limits of Historical Inquiry. 
Nepantla: Views from South 1:2. Duke University Press. 2000. pp. 391-412.   
15 Grandin, Greg. Chapter 16: History, Motive, Law, Intent. Combining Historical and Legal Methods in Understanding 
Guatemala’s 1981-1983 Genocide in Gellately, Robert and Kiernan, Ben. The Specter of Genocide – Mass Murder in 
Historical Perspective. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 2003. p.350 
16 Ibid. p.350 
17 Grandin, Greg. Chronicles of a Guatemalan Genocide Foretold. Violence, Trauma, and the Limits of Historical Inquiry. 
Nepantla: Views from South 1:2. Duke University Press. 2000. pp. 391-412. p.408 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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an integrated part of the more than three decades long conflict in which acts of genocide took 
place, namely in the years from 1981-83.20  
Keeping in mind the reception of Guatemala: Memory of Silence it is interesting to take note of the 
fact that this very same struggle had already struck a chord, so to say, in the Peace Accords, 
where it is stated, in the fourth out of the fourteen concepts that it was build upon, that:  
“The Guatemalan people are entitled to know the full truth about the human rights violations 
and acts of violence that occurred in the context of the internal armed conflict. Shedding light objectively and 
impartially on what happened will contribute to the process of national reconciliation and democratization in the 
country.”21 
In its endeavour to shed light on the past, this very statement not only sought to provide space 
for the testimonies but made them an integrated part of the process of reconciliation and 
democratization, which the Guatemalan society stands face to face with.  
The most notable efforts in this struggle includes the aforementioned report, 
Guatemala: Memory of Silence, carried out by the Guatemalan Commission for Historical 
Clarification (CEH) and the work of the Recovery of Historical Memory project (REMHI22) 
Guatemala: Never Again!23, which was carried out by the Guatemalan Archdiocesan Human 
Rights Office (ODHAG24).  
The Recovery of Historical Memory (REMHI) project was presented to the 
bishops of the Guatemalan Episcopal Conference in October 1994 by the Archdiocesan 
Human Rights Office headed by Bishop Monsignor Juan Gerardi Conedera (ODHAG).25 In 
this regard, it is important to note that the Catholic Church of Guatemala had participated in 
the peace negotiations from the very beginning, a circumstance that not least seems to derive 
from the fact that a vast number of its members had been the target of repression and/or killed 
during the conflict.26  
                                            
20 Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala: Memory of Silence; Report of the Commission for 
Historical Clarification, Conclusions and Recommendations. Conclusions II. Human rights violations, acts of violence and 
assignment of responsibility, §122 
21 Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace. See http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/guatemala/firm-lasting-peace.php 
22 After its Spanish abbreviation: Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica, REMHI. 
23 Guatemala Never Again! Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, and London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1999.  
24 After its Spanish abbreviation: Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala, ODGAH. 
25 Guatemala: Never Again! Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, and London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1999. 
Introductory Remarks p.xxvii. 
26 Sieder, Rachel. Chapter 5: War, Peace, and Memory Politics in Central America in Barahona de Brito, Alexandra. 
Gonzaléz-Enríquez, Carmen and Aguilar, Paloma. The Politics of Memory. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 2001. p.176 
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The REMHI project was commenced prior to the establishment of the CEH and was 
envisioned as an: “... initial form of support for the commission’s activities [and the, Ed.] search for 
information centered on rural communication whose physical inaccessibility and linguistic diversity would 
complicate the commission’s task.”27 
The investigation and the taking of testimonies was conducted by pastoral teams of eleven 
dioceses28, together with the help of: “the promoters (animadores) of reconciliation (...) translators, 
transcribers, and the support staff of the Archdiocesan Human Rights Office (...) data processors, consultants, 
field liaisons, and the Guatemalan and international volunteers.”29  
However, it is important to note that the REMHI project differed from more traditional truth 
commissions30, not least those endorsed by governments and/or the United Nations, leading to 
the question on how it was even possible to carry out this project. In this regard, the strong 
influence and presence of the Catholic Church of Guatemala seems to be keywords, as well as, 
similar projects in nearby countries inspired the launch of the REMHI project e.g. the Chilean 
church’s Vicariate of Solidarity31 or the report Brasil: Nunca Mais carried out by Catholic and 
Protestant church leaders in Brazil.32 It is also interesting that a similar, or even stronger 
influence, was seen in South Africa where Desmond Tutu and the Anglican Church in South 
Africa played a central part in the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South 
Africa.33  
That the Catholic Church of Guatemala was able to carry out such a project 
implies that the church is an actor playing a significant role in the Guatemalan society. It does 
                                            
27 Guatemala: Never Again! Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, and London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1999. 
Introductory Remarks p.xxvii 
28 Ibid.   
29 Ibid. Acknowledgements p.xxi 
30 Priscilla B. Hayner provides the following definition of truth commissions: “”...”truth commissions,” a term that implies a specific 
kind of inquiry, even while allowing for considerable variation between the different commissions. I use the term to refer to those bodies that share 
the following characteristics: (1) truth commissions focus on the past; (2) they investigate a pattern of abuses over a period of time, rather than a 
specific event; (3) a truth commission is a temporary body, typically in operation for six months to two years, and completing work with the 
submission of a report; and (4) these commissions are official sanctioned, authorized, or empowered by the state (and sometimes also by the armed 
opposition, as in a peace accord).””  
See Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths. New York. Routledge. 2002. p.14  
Hayner also points out that these truth commissions are different of the ones that might be called ‘historical truth 
commissions’ which are: “... present-day government-sponsored inquires into abuses by the state that took place many years earlier (...) Such 
an inquiry is not established as part of a political transition....” Ibid. p.17 
 Additionally: “There are also important examples of nongovernmental projects that have documented the patterns of abuse of a prior regime, 
usually undertaken by national human rights organisations, sometimes with church backing.” Ibid. p.21 
31 See http://www.fundacionprincipedeasturias.org/ing/04/premiados/trayectorias/trayectoria605.html 
32 See e.g.: http://www.peoplebuildingpeace.org/thestories/article.php?id=133&typ=theme&pid=31  
33 See e.g.: http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm  
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so both historically, since it was not least through the church and missions that the colonial 
state managed to establish its hegemony34, and in more recent times with the Catholic reform 
movement Accíon Católica that together with related foreign missions, such as the North 
American Maryknoll mission, moved out into the villages founding centers and chapels.35 On 
the same note, it is interesting to observe that: “Although Catholic Action was formed as an 
anticommunist movement that supported the military governments of the 1950s, it turned to a more critical 
position as parts of the clergy approached the program of liberation theology.”36  
As a result of this turn, the movement became involved with politics, which in some regions 
concerned ethnic struggles and in yet other regions, it was engaged with communal 
socioeconomic development37 or as it is stated by the CEH: 
“... the Catholic Church [abandoned, Ed.] its conservative position in favour of the Second 
Vatican Council (1962-1965) and the Episcopal Conference of Medellin (1968), prioritising its work with 
excluded, poor and under-privileged sectors and promoting the construction of a more just and equitable society. 
These doctrinal and pastoral changes clashed with counterinsurgency strategy, which considered Catholics to be 
allies of the guerrillas and therefore part of the internal enemy...”38 
And it is not at least due to this circumstance, that the Catholic Church of Guatemala became a 
part of the conflict, together with the fact that their research was given on to the CEH that I 
find it is imperative to make an inquiry into the report of the REMHI project. 
The Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH), administered by 
United Nations39, was, as already stated, an integrated part of the Peace Accords.  
As designated in the Peace Accords, the United Nations appointed a non-Guatemalan to chair 
the commission, the choice fell on Christian Tomuschat, a German law professor, who years 
                                            
34 Stepputat, Finn. Urbanizing the countryside. Armed Conflict, State Formation, and the Politics of Place in Contemporary 
Guatemala in Hansen, Blom and Stepputat, Finn. States of Imagination – Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial 
State. Durham & London. Duke University Press. 2001. p.288 
35 Ibid. p.293  
36 Ibid. p.293 
37 Ibid. p.293 
38 Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala: Memory of Silence; Report of the Commission for 
Historical Clarification, Conclusions and Recommendations. Conclusions I. The tragedy of the armed confrontation, §15 
39 Including the support of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Office for Project Service (UNOPS), 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala 
(MINUGUA) as well as the lending of experts to the Commission from the International Criminal Tribute for the former 
Yugoslavia.   
Ibid. Acknowledgements p.1 
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earlier had served the UN as an independent expert on Guatemala.40 The other two 
commissioners of the CEH, Otilia Lux de Cotí, a Mayan scholar, and Edgar Alfredo Balsells 
Tojo, a Guatemalan lawyer, were subsequently appointed by Tomuschat. The CEH was 
formally installed on 31st of July 1997, after a preparation period that had lasted three-and-a-
half months. It operated in several phases and with up to 14 field offices, that were open to the 
public for four to five months, during the peak of the investigation. The staff size ranged up to 
200 staff members, consisting of Guatemalans and non-Guatemalans, to fewer than 100 staff 
members during the period of analysis and report writing.41 Besides its own investigation the 
CEH also incorporated date from the REMHI project, as well as, the Centro Internacional para 
Investigaciones en Derechos Humanos (CIIDH).42 Furthermore, and as noted in the 
acknowledgements of the report, various other Guatemalan human rights organisations: “... 
made extremely valuable contributions to the CEH’s work.”43  
In addition, the CEH gained support from a wide range of international actors including the 
Unites States of America, the European Union and several governments44, as well as it gained 
help from international NGOs.45 As it can be gathered, the CEH had a huge advantage due to 
this support, although the REMHI had support from some of the same actors46, and the 
significant funding that went with it. Furthermore, the Government of the United States of 
America declassified important documents concerning the conflict, and by doing so granted 
access to information that up until then had been unavailable.47 Despite this massive support, 
and as I have already stated, these two reports, were not recognised by the Government of the 
                                            
40 Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths. New York. Routledge. 2002. p.46 
41 Ibid. 
42 See Ball, Patrick. Kobrak, Paul and F. Spirer, Herbert. State Violence in Guatemala, 1960-1996: A Quantitative Reflection, 
American Association for the advancement of Science, 1999. 
Available at: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ciidh/qr/english/index.html 
43 Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala: Memory of Silence; Report of the Commission for 
Historical Clarification, Conclusions and Recommendations. Acknowledgements p.1 
44 Acknowledgements p.1Including the governments of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.  
Ibid. Acknowledgements p.1 
45 Ibid. Acknowledgements p.1-2 
46 Including the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Assistance (NORAD), the Danish  International Development Agency (DANIDA), OXFAM UK, the German 
Development Service (DED), the European Union.  
For more see Guatemala: Never Again! Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, and London: Catholic Institute for International 
Relations, 1999. Acknowledgments p.xxi  
47For more information on the The National Security Archive Guatemala Project see 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/guatemala/index.htm 
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Republic of Guatemala. Nevertheless, they seem to have, at least to some extent, provided an 
opening for public discussions on issues related to the conflict.48  
However, speaking of the past in Guatemala has consequences, with one of the 
most disturbing examples being the murder of Guatemalan Bishop Monsignor Juan Gerardi 
Conedera on 26th of April 1998, merely 48 hours after the presentation of the REMHI report – 
a project he had led.  
Today, eleven years after this very symbolic murder, the fact is that, although the Constitution 
of Guatemala protects and guarantees freedom of speech, academic freedom and freedom of 
association, those:  
“… who stridently condemn the government or past human rights abuses can face persecution” 
and that “…scholars have received death threats for raising questions about past human rights abuses or 
continuing injustices” as well as “human rights groups are the targets of frequent death threats and acts of 
violence.” 49  
These threats and violations often have fatal results and there seems to be a long way before 
this cataclysm of violence will come to a halt. As for now, the tendency is of an escalating 
nature e.g. with the 2007 presidential, congressional and municipal elections being the bloodiest 
in the country’s recent history.50   
Faced with this scenario it seems reasonable to call into question the role of 
memory and history in the conflict and how these objects of the past clash together to form an 
axiom where a circle of political conflict is continuously spinning. This conflict is not least 
sustained by what can be thought of as competing narratives51 that, in their efforts to promote 
or hinder the resurfacing of the past, ultimately affect the prospects of development in 
Guatemala.  
                                            
48 Oglesby, Elisabeth. Educating Citizens in Postwar Guatemala. Radical History Review. Truth Commissions: State Terror, 
History and Memory. Issue 97, Winter 2007, pp.77-98. 
49 Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2008 – Guatemala. 2 July 2008.  
See http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/487ca20fc.html 
50 Ibid. 
51 I understand the notion of narrative as described by Hayden White: “”Narrative is at once a mode of discourse, a manner of 
speaking, and the product produced by this mode of discourse [underlining Ed.]. When this mode of discourse is used to represent “real events” , 
as in “historical narrative,” the result is a kind of discourse with specific linguistic, grammatical, and rhetorical features, that is, “narrative 
history.”””  
See White, Hayden. The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory. History and Theory, Vol.23, No.1. 
(Feb., 1984), pp.1-33. p.32 
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A premise for understanding this continuous conflict is then, and as it has been claimed; 
“…that control of a society’s memory largely conditions the hierarchy of power (…) the organisation of collective 
memory (…) the question of the control and ownership of information being a crucial political issue.”52  
And it is on these grounds that this thesis approaches the conflict and in doing so it centres on 
the set of narratives, the conclusions and the recommendations put forth by the two 
Guatemalan truth commissions.  
                                            
52 Connerton, Paul. How Societies Remember. Cambridge University Press 1989. p.1 
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2. Research Question   
  
 How can the two truth commissions, the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) 
and the Recovery of Historical Memory project (REMHI), be understood as actors that, through their 
production of a set of narratives, participate in the space of post-conflict state formation in Guatemala?  
 
In this thesis I will examine the work of the two truth commissions, the Guatemalan 
Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) and the Recovery of Historical Memory 
project (REMHI), in Guatemala. By dealing with the reports of the CEH and the REMHI 
projects, this thesis calls into question the testimonies of violence – how they are being 
turned into a set of narratives, what is being narrated, and what the commissions are trying 
to achieve through their narration – or as it can be rephrased, how can the two truth 
commissions understood as actors in the post-conflict environment of Guatemala that has 
existed since the peace agreement were signed in 1996. 
As a first step, I focus upon the work carried out by truth commissions, their tradition, as 
well as other aspects connected to the discussion on truth commissions – not least the 
notions of power and knowledge, as well as the notion of silence. By doing so I am trying to 
develop an analytical framework from which it is possible to better understand and question 
these bodies. The second step focuses upon the conflict in Guatemala, and especially the 
years 1981-83, where violence reached its highest intensity. Furthermore, I have chosen to 
focus upon some of the actors, although far from all, behind the conflict as well as I 
emphasise the question of genocide and impunity. Finally, I have, as a preliminary approach 
to the analysis, chosen to provide a discussion on the alternative character of the REMHI in 
which I especially focus on the use of the notion of martyrdom in Guatemala: Never Again!  
It is on the basis of these discussions that I turn to the analysis of the thesis. In doing so I 
especially focus upon the notion of silence, not least since it is one of the most prevalent 
notions throughout both reports, and in recognising this, I try to question what is meant by 
silence, if there is more to this notion, or to be more precise, if the violence and silence 
somehow can be thought to be related.   
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2.1 Thoughts on methodology, sources and the limitations of the thesis 
 
As already stated, this thesis focuses upon of the CEH and the REMHI project and introduces 
an analysis on their narration of a violent past. In this regard, I have found that such an analysis 
holds various challenges and I will try to present some of them. As an entry point, I will stress 
that I have found it hard to settle upon an exact timeframe of this inquiry – for is the thesis 
dealing with the years 1981-83, where the bursts of violence was at its highest, or should I focus 
upon the years 1996-99 when the Peace Accords were signed and the truth commissions 
carried out their work? However, since I am dealing with reports that have the period 1981-83, 
and the violence committed in these years, as their primary focus, I found that this 
circumstance ultimately decided the focal point of the thesis, nevertheless, the focus on the 
period between 1981-83 primarily serve to strengthen the focus on the violence.  
The studies carried out in this thesis have introduced several methodological 
concerns. To begin with, I have found that a primary limitation is caused by the fact that I have 
not carried out my own fieldwork. This ultimately affects the thesis, since I have not been able 
to talk with persons touched by this violence and lacking this data, I have not been able to 
clarify whether the reports actually changed anything.  
The second limitation is that I have found it hard to describe the current situation in 
Guatemala. This circumstance is also, at least to a large extent, caused by the lack of proper 
field work, as well as the fact that information and data on this subject is hard to come by. 
However, I will try to portray some recent developments in the epilogue of the thesis (See 
Epilogue – Guatemala now). 
The primary sources of this thesis are the English versions of the REMHI and 
CEH reports: the international abridged version of the REMHI report, Guatemala: Never 
Again!53 and Guatemala: Memory of Silence54 in which the conclusions and recommendations of the 
CEH are presented. The choice of focusing on the English versions is of course a 
methodological concern, since dealing with these shorter versions will inevitable rule out certain 
findings. But although they are condensed versions, it should be kept in mind that they are the 
                                            
53 Guatemala: Never Again! Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, and London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1999. 
54 Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala: Memory of Silence; Report of the Commission for 
Historical Clarification, Conclusions and Recommendations. See 
http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html 
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REMHI’s and CEH’s own representations of their work, and consequently, they should be 
thought as being as valid as the Spanish versioned counterparts.  
Furthermore, I am aware of the circumstance that when dealing with Guatemala: 
Memory of Silence and Guatemala: Never Again! I am actually working with reports that in many 
ways seem to be, or actually are, biased in its view on the Government of the Republic of 
Guatemala and the Guatemalan Army. However, I do not believe that this compromises the 
research question of the thesis; on the contrary, I find that it might actually strengthen it.  
This circumstance also emphasise another question – how should these individual recollections 
be dealt with it and further are they reliable as sources on the past? However, since the thesis 
seeks to provide a discussion on the set of narratives that are produced by the REMHI project 
and the CEH, and not a clarification of the conflict or the genocide and its perpetrators, I find 
that this question is of a lesser concern. Instead I believe that the primary concern is on how 
testimonies, these narratives of violence, can be understood as individual recollections of the 
past that contribute to a larger narrative – that of the REMHI project and the CEH.  
Nevertheless, I will still stress that I have tried to be very careful when dealing with these 
individual recollections, since I find that working with this maze of individual beliefs and 
emotions, is anything but a straightforward process. This is a circumstance that time and again 
has led me to question when I should stop this inquiry into violence – when is it enough?  
I admit that I have found the border very hard to define, and I am still not sure whether I have 
crossed it or not, which again touches upon another question: Am I not, at least to some 
extent, actually contributing to the narration on the violence in Guatemala? 
In concern to the choice of literature I have drawn upon scholars from several 
different scientific traditions, such as anthropology, history, political science, philosophy, 
sociology, law, human rights studies etc. And while this might be thought of as a disadvantage, 
I am convinced that this methodological choice has contributed to a broader analytical 
framework and a perspective that has strengthened the inquiries carried out in the thesis.  
However, I will refrain, at least for the moment, from going into a further discussion on these 
perspectives, not least since the discussions presented in the analytical framework, as well as 
elsewhere, seems to provide exactly that. Nevertheless, I find that it might be of some sense to 
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highlight a few of the considerations that I have had in regards to the choice of literature as 
well as the sources dealing with Guatemala. 
To begin with, sources on violence in Guatemala are hard to come by, however, I 
have tried to meet this challenge by using some very well informed sources, such as The 
Guatemalan Military Project - A Violence Called Democracy55 by Jennifer Schirmer, which is an 
invaluable contribution to the subject, since it, besides recounting the conflict, also includes 
several interviews with some of the military officers that stood behind the Plan Nacional de 
Seguridad y Desarrollo (National Plan of Security and Development) that ended up claiming 
thousands of lives. Valuable insights are also provided in Buried Secrets – Truth and Human Rights 
in Guatemala56 by Victoria Sanford, who has carried out intensive fieldwork in Guatemala. 
Furthermore the work by Greg Grandin, who worked for the CEH, which can be found in The 
Specter of Genocide – Mass Murder in Historical Perspective57 and the article Chronicles of a Guatemalan 
Genocide Foretold – Violence, Trauma, and the Limits of Historical Inquiry58 stands out.  
Other important sources include Insecurity, State, and Impunity in Latin America59 and Urbanizing the 
countryside. Armed Conflict, State Formation, and the Politics of Place in Contemporary Guatemala60 by 
Finn Stepputat as well as the work by Elizabeth Oglesby, who also worked for the CEH, 
Educating Citizens in Postwar Guatemala.61 
Turning to the questions that arose in regards to the discussion on truth 
commissions I have drawn upon literature that engage with notions on silence, storytelling, 
power and the question of narratives and thereby testimonies. The intention has been to 
provide perspectives on some of the notions and challenges that truth commissions are faced 
with in their work. However, I also realise that by doing so I engage with several questions that 
                                            
55 Schirmer, Jennifer. The Guatemalan Military Project - A Violence Called Democracy. Philadelphia. University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 1998. 
56 Sanford, Victoria. Buried Secrets – Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala. New York. Palgrave Macmillan. 2003. 
57 Grandin, Greg. Chapter 16: History, Motive, Law, Intent. Combining Historical and Legal Methods in Understanding 
Guatemala’s 1981-1983 Genocide in Gellately, Robert and Kiernan, Ben. The Specter of Genocide – Mass Murder in 
Historical Perspective. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 2003. 
58 Grandin, Greg. Chronicles of a Guatemalan Genocide Foretold – Violence, Trauma, and the Limits of Historical Inquiry. 
Nepantla: Views from South 1:2. Copyright 2000 by Duke University Press. 
59 Stepputat, Finn. Chapter 9: Insecurity, State, and Impunity in Latin America in Andersen, Louise. Møller, Bjørn and 
Stepputat, Finn. Fragile States and Insecure People? – Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century. New 
York. Palgrave Macmillan. 2007. 
60 Stepputat, Finn. Urbanizing the countryside. Armed Conflict, State Formation, and the Politics of Place in Contemporary 
Guatemala in Hansen, Blom and Stepputat, Finn. States of Imagination – Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial 
State. Durham & London. Duke University Press. 2001. 
61 Oglesby, Elisabeth. Educating Citizens in Postwar Guatemala. Radical History Review. Truth Commissions: State Terror, 
History and Memory. Issue 97, Winter 2007, pp.77-98. 
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have, and still are, the subject of varied discussions and debate – a circumstance that is also 
mirrored in the literature on the subject.  
This said, finding literature dealing with truth commissions, not to mention in relation to 
Guatemala turned out to be a harder than I had thought. As a result one of the immediate 
challenges was to find perspectives that could be applied on the subject or somehow touched 
upon it. In this regard I have found the work by Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths – Facing 
the Challenge of Truth Commissions62, to be one of the of the most thorough inquiries on the 
subject. Not least since Hayner provides an introduction to all of the 21 truth commissions that 
have been initiated since the first of its kind in 1974, as well as she provide discussions on the 
work of truth commissions such as the question of healing, reconciliation, justice and truth are 
presented. Another contribution is Shattered Voices – Language, Violence, and the work of Truth 
Commissions63, by Teresa Godwin Phelps, in which an interesting theoretical framework, 
although I do not agree on all the points, on the work of truth commissions is presented. On a 
related note I will add that since Phelps, among other things, speak of space I have tried to 
provide a short clarification on how I perceive the notion of space and here pointing to The 
Production of Space by Henri Lefebvre.64 I have also chosen to present Thomas Brudholm and 
his discussion on the notion of resentment, since I, to some extent, agree with Brudholm that 
such notions often seems to be put aside in the work of truth commissions, in his article 
Revisiting Resentments: Jean Améry and the Dark Side of Forgiveness and Reconciliation65 as well as I look 
to Jean Améry’s own work in At the Mind’s Limit.66 Another concern is the theological nature of 
the REMHI project and their continuous use of the notion of martyrdom, which I have tried to 
frame in the arguments put forth by Carol Straw in “A Very Special Death”: Christian Martyrdom in 
Its Classical Context in Sacrificing The Self – Perspectives on Martyrdom and Religion. 67 
In regards to the notion of power, I have turned to Michel Foucault and some of his arguments 
on the relationship between power and knowledge, of which I find the arguments on truth to 
                                            
62 Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths. New York. Routledge. 2002. 
63 Phelps, Teresa Godwin. Shattered Voices. Philadelphia. University of Pennsylvania Press. 2004. 
64 Lefebvre, Henri. The Production of Space. Oxford. Blackwell. 1991. 
65 Brudholm, Thomas. Revisiting Resentments: Jean Améry and the Dark Side of Forgiveness and Reconciliation. Journal of 
Human Rights, 5:7–26. 
66 Améry, Jean. At the Mind’s Limit. Bloomington. Indiana University Press. 1980. 
67 Straw, Carol. Chapter 3: “A Very Special Death”: Christian Martyrdom in Its Classical Context in Cormack, Margaret. 
Sacrificing The Self – Perspectives on Martyrdom and Religion. New York, Oxford University Press, 2002. 
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be of particular interest, presented in Power/Knowledge: Selected Writings and Other Interviews 1972-
1977.68 It is also in this discussion that I touch upon Michael Taussig and his thoughts on 
public secrets, found in Defacement69, which are an interesting as well as a slightly thought 
provoking take on the subject. And finally, in regards to the discussion of narratives and 
testimonies, I have presented some contributions and arguments from different traditions70 not 
least Hayden White’s The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory71 since I find that 
this article provides several interesting insights that can be applied to the discussion on the 
value of these testimonies of violence. And it is by a presentation and discussion of these 
contributions that I hope to have mapped out an analytical framework that at least clarifies 
some of the aspects and challenges of that truth commissions and their work.  
 
                                            
68 Foucault, Michel. Power/Knowledge: Selected Writings and Other Interviews 1972-1977, ed. Gordon, Colin. New York. 
Pantheon Books. 1980. 
69 Taussig, Michael. Defacement. Stanford, California. Stanford University Press. 1999. 
70 Ricoeur, Paul. Memory, History, Forgetting. Chicago & London. Chicago University Press. 2004. Connerton, Paul. How 
Societies Remember. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1989. 
71 White, Hayden. The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory. History and Theory, Vol.23, No.1. (Feb., 
1984), pp.1-33. p.32.  
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3. An analytical framework on dealing with the past 
 
”Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past,”72 
- George Orwell 
 
These words of Orwell, although they have been the object of discussions ever since they 
found their way to print, can act as a prism on the certain kind of conflict which post-conflict 
societies, such as Guatemala, often stands face-to-face with as a dominating part of very 
complicated transition processes. The conflict can be thought of as a conflict of the past and 
one of establishing the truth, or rather the bringing forth of a number of truths, which again 
can be understood as the uncovering and establishing of what happened during the previous 
oppressive regime. Admittedly, the words of Orwell are of pure fiction but they regain 
significance in their resonance with Connerton’s statement, as mentioned in the introduction, 
that the memory of the given society plays a fundamental factor in defining the hierarchy of 
power. The question of control and ownership of this very same memory is therefore a crucial 
political issue.73 What this ‘Orwellian-prism’ allows for is then to understand the past or rather 
history, as a kind of political conflict. And as such it provides for the setting of a scene, in 
which, the challenges of the work of truth commissions can be thought of as an instrument of 
conflict resolution. 
 
 
3.1 The work of truth commissions 
 
Approaching such a notion, truth commissions as instruments of conflict resolution, it seems 
only prudent to inquire into the very idea behind these official truth commissions – an idea 
which seems to presuppose that the finding and stating of the truth, what happened in the past, 
is a knowledge that is essential in the restructuring of countries once torn apart by oppressive 
                                            
72 Orwell, George. Nineteen Eighty-Four. Penguin Books in association with Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd. London. First 
published by Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd 1949. Reprinted Edition 1990. p.260 
73 Connerton, Paul. How Societies Remember. Cambridge University Press 1989. p.1 
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regimes. Thus dealing with the past not only focuses on the clarification and acknowledgement 
of the past but has become a process that apparently also bears notions of healing, 
reconciliation, accountability etc.74 Furthermore, and as noted by Priscilla B. Hayner, these 
truth commissions have often gone beyond finding the truth and: “... have become the most 
prominent government initiatives dealing with past crimes and the central point out of which other measures for 
accountability, reparations, and reform programs are developed.”75  
And it is from such a perspective that truth commissions can be perceived as an instrument in 
conflict-resolution or rather post-conflict resolution. And as result, I find that this circumstance 
provides an argument in which history can be thought of as both conflict and as a way to 
resolve conflict. However, what I want to argue is that these truth commissions might also be 
perceived as trying to promote another effort – that is the question on the reconstruction of a 
given society.  
Although these truth commissions gained a certain prominence in the post-Cold War context, 
the turn towards establishing these post-conflict institutions already began in 1974, with the 
first inquiry of its kind being the Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearance of People in Uganda since 
the 25th January, 1971,76 and has since that time slowly gained momentum as an integrated part 
of transition processes out of which the reports of the Argentinean, Chilean, El Salvadoran, 
South African77 and finally the Guatemalan commissions stands out. Not least, due to their 
size, their impact on political transition, the national and international attention they received 
and, in the case of Guatemala, the argument of genocide.78 All of these commissions have gone 
under different names but share common characteristics. However, while they have much in 
common, their mandates and powers differ to a considerable extent, not least, since the 
commissions are: “... obliged to fulfil the direction given to them in the written mandate, or terms of 
reference...”79 but also because some of the commissions benefit from the support from e.g. the 
United Nations or other parts of the international community. Furthermore, the mandate or 
                                            
74 See e.g. Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths. New York. Routledge. 2002. p.24 
75 Ibid. p.24 
76 Ibid. p. 14. For a list of the most prominent truth commissions, historical truth commissions and other forms of official 
and semiofficial inquiries into the past see Appendix 1, Charts 1-3. p.305-315 
77 The titles of the reports are as follows: Argentina - Nunca Más (1985), Chile – Informe de la Comisión Nacional de la 
Verdad y Reconciliación (1991), El Salvador – De la Locura a la Esperanza (1993), South Africa – Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of South Africa report (1998). 
78 Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths. New York. Routledge. 2002. p.32 
79 Ibid. p.72  
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the terms of reference inevitably, since it outlines the framework and scope of the investigation, 
ends up defining the truth(s) produced.80 The result being that some commissions had a 
considerable effect on the given country while some seems to have gone relatively unnoticed 
by. 
The surfacing of these bodies of truth is according to Hayner: “... partly due to the 
limited reach of courts, and partly out of a recognition that even successful prosecutions do not resolve the conflict 
and pain associated with past abuses...”81 but this recognition also underscores the dilemma which 
the truth commissions are often confronted with – the question of providing for justice. 
 When it comes to justice, the truth commissions are inferior to courts since they do not hold 
any judicial powers and therefore cannot, according to Hayner, replace trials. The strength of 
the truth commissions is, instead, their broader mandate to investigate patterns of repression as 
well as causes and consequences of political violence.82 This mandate together with the 
approach that centres on victims/survivors, the taking of testimonies and the later publishing 
of the findings in a public, and officially sanctioned, report, often offers and represents a first 
sign of acknowledgement by the state – that the crimes it committed were wrong.83 As a 
consequence, I find that the question on justice adds to the question that I have put forth – for 
if not justice, what is it then that these commissions offer?  
In regards to this question it has been stated that countries that have been touched by violent 
conflict often suffer from a syndrome of silence forced upon people by the former regime.84 
And I find that it is this silence, although I admit that its extent and nature is a bit unclear, that 
the truth commissions first and foremost seek to challenge through a clarification and 
acknowledgment of the given country’s past or, as it has been stated: “... the report of a truth 
commission reclaims a country’s history and opens it for public review.”85 What the commissions offer is 
therefore not necessarily new truth(s) per se, since for the victims/survivors the stories of 
violence are all too well known, but what they do provide for, by way of taking testimonies and 
the publishing of an official report, is instead an acknowledgement of “long-silenced facts”86 that is 
                                            
80 Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths. New York. Routledge. 2002. p.72 
81 Ibid. p.14 
82 Ibid. p.16 
83 Ibid. p.16 
84 Phelps, Teresa Godwin. Shattered Voices. Philadelphia. University of Pennsylvania Press. 2004. p.48 
85 Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths. New York. Routledge. 2002. p.25 
86 Ibid. p.26 
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often very powerful “... precisely because official denial has been so pervasive.”87 This places the truth 
commissions as official bodies investigating the past, and their work between the knowledge of 
victims and witnesses and the acknowledgement of the facts in the public and by the given state. 
The truth commissions provide the victims/survivors with a strong public voice and it is from 
this perspective that the giving of testimony can be thought of as a process of empowerment.  
 
 
3.2 Recovering of voices – storytelling as space? 
 
Arriving at such an argument, I turn to the idea that the reports of truth commissions, through 
the official acknowledgment of so-called long-silenced facts, have the ability to empower 
victims/survivors. From such a point, I find that it is important to consider and question the 
notion of silence and the power by which an oppressive regime can seemingly enforce silence 
upon its people. The question of silence is therefore one which is central to both the 
understanding of repression and the work of truth commissions, or as Teresa Godwin Phelps 
states: “An oppressive regime silences and fragments the people. In the midst of that silence, it constructs its own 
narrative about what happened...”88 
Following this line of thought, Phelps situates voice and language, both the loss as well as the 
recovering of the two, as central to the work of truth commissions and especially the role it can 
have in regards to achieving justice. Although I am sceptical, in regards to this question on 
justice, I still find some of Phelps’ ideas to be of essential value, not least when it comes to 
thinking of silence as something that has been enforced on the victims/survivors and which 
should be opposed through the giving of testimonies. Returning to the idea of the Orwellian-
prism and Connerton I find that Phelps introduces a similar notion, namely that of the political 
use of narratives:  
“”… the use and misuse of language characterize the activities of an oppressive regime (...) 
concealing the truth (...) they construct their own narratives about their activities, thereby creating a “master 
narrative” about the country and its citizens...””89 
                                            
87 Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths. New York. Routledge. 2002. p.27 
88 Phelps, Teresa Godwin. Shattered Voices. Philadelphia. University of Pennsylvania Press. 2004. p.48 
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25 | P a g e  
 
And it is through the creation of such a narrative, and the creation of a framework of false 
narratives90, that a regime is able to conceal and justify its activities, and in doing so it is 
effectively able to enforce a silence that will be reacted upon if challenged. However, I find that 
this scenario overlooks a question – what happens if this societal condition, this silence, is 
being opposed? A question, which I argue is of particular interest since I believe that the 
REMHI and CEH are actually constructing a narrative, a set of narratives that reject the 
narrative of the former regime in Guatemala, thereby creating a kind of counter narrative. 
And it is in such a setting that I perceive testimonies given by victims/survivors to be 
contributing to the story and storytelling of the given truth commission and thereby I hold 
them to play a central part in the very production of this new set of narratives. In this regard, I 
agree with Phelps that is also of great significance that the act of storytelling does not end up 
creating a new single-voiced narrative, in which, it might risk repeating the sins of the narrative 
imposed by the regime that it wishes to oppose. Instead, it should take a form of multitude – in 
which the voices of the victims/survivors – the individuals, families and the country are heard 
and acknowledged.91  
 In accordance with this idea, Phelps points out a number of different ways 
whereby truth commissions, through storytelling, can empower victims/survivors and enable 
them to come to terms with the former regime.92 93 I will focus on two of these: Stories as Ways 
of discovering the truth94 and Storytelling as Carnival95 due to the fact that they touch upon essential 
aspects on the giving of testimonies, as well as they present some interesting and alternative 
notions on the subject. In this regard, I find the notion of how truth commissions offer a kind 
of space96 for the suppressed knowledge of the victims/survivors to be of particular interest. 
The idea of stories as ‘Ways of discovering the truth’ turns its focus upon the 
difference, although Phelps admits “... that both can serve crucial roles in a transitional democracy...”97, 
                                            
90 Phelps, Teresa Godwin. Shattered Voices. Philadelphia. University of Pennsylvania Press. 2004. p.47 
91 Ibid. p.51 
92 Ibid. Chapter 4: What Can Stories Do? p.52-73 
93 Phelps notes that: “These seven are not meant to be exhaustive; there may well be other benefits. Additionally, they are potential benefits 
and are not necessarily realized in every or even any truth reports.”  Ibid. p.147 note 11. 
94 Ibid. p.61-67 
95 Ibid. p.67-69 
96 I think of space as both a vacuum as well as a setting in which, as described by Henri Lefebvre: “… space is a (social) product 
(…) the space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and action; that in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of 
control, and hence domination, of power…” See Lefebvre, Henri. The Production of Space. Oxford. Blackwell. 1991. p.26  
97 Phelps, Teresa Godwin. Shattered Voices. Philadelphia. University of Pennsylvania Press. 2004. p.62  
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between trials and truth commissions, or in other words, what the two spaces they create 
enable – the essential question being, which kind of truth is actually being produced in these 
spaces? In contrast to the truth offered through trials, which is a “”microscopic truth,” which is 
“factual, verifiable and can be documented.””98, truth commissions offers space for a kind of ““dialogic 
truth,” which is “social truth, truth of experience that is established through interaction, discussion and 
debate,””99 Thus both trials and truth commissions produce stories concerning the truth(s), 
however, the situation faced by many people in transitional democracies should be taken into 
regards, not least the circumstance that: “... many perpetrators and victims will never enter a courtroom, 
will never have an opportunity to tell or hear the truth.”100 And it is in such an era, a period of transition 
away from oppression, that the truth commission offer what many victims/survivors do not 
have: an official space where they can give testimony and tell their stories.101 The space of the 
truth commission is therefore one in which it is possible to challenge the narrative constructed 
by the oppressive regime. Subsequently, the strength of the truth commission becomes its 
ability of storytelling, which in turn, provides for a setting that can: “... reveal truth about what 
oppression did to people-not just the recitation of events, but what oppression felt like, how it changed and 
destroyed lives... “102  
However, as much as I hold Phelps’ statements, on what these truth commissions offer, to be 
very descriptive, I still find that the following question should kept in mind: What if this space 
and the stories produced are contested – is it then not possible to think of this situation as  
conflict? 
Turning to the characteristics of this space and the notion of ‘Storytelling as 
Carnival’, Phelps offers an alternative view on how truth commissions can be thought to have 
characteristics in common with that of the concept of carnival, by Russian literary theorist and 
philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin. From this perspective, truth commissions provide a less 
restrained space for the stories of the victims/survivors, and here quoting Bakhtin, Phelps 
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states that this space is characterised by a: “”... temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from 
the established order (...) the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions.””103  
The storytelling made possible in this alternative space of carnival is one in which participation 
is open for all, and consequently, it holds the potential to: “... open up and transform traditional, 
constrained spaces and to allow people (...) to be liberated from the forms and fears that might restrain them.”104 
It is through these traits of carnival that a truth commission, through its storytelling, as 
opposed to trials, is able to: “... invert the normal rules of formal judicial procedure (...) the official 
established order can be temporarily obliterated ...”105 What the notion of carnival offers is then an 
understanding on how truth commission reports and the space created by its polyphonic 
nature, the encompassing of numerous voices in their storytelling, is making possible, a:  
“”... dialogic truth in which “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of 
an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of 
their dialogic interaction”.””106  
Although the question concerning the contestation of the work done by the given truth 
commission still persists, I find it interesting that, in regards to Phelps and her recognition of 
the many different effects of storytelling, it seems possible to think of storytelling and the 
giving of testimony as being related to a notion of power. Furthermore, this idea also resonates 
in the writings on Guatemala, by Victoria Sanford, which notes that:  
“Despite living memory of terror, despite fear and threats, massacre survivors come forward to 
talk, to remember, and to share (...) In the process of giving and witnessing testimony, survivors create new public 
spaces for discourse and practice – the essence of human agency.”107   
What I believe is accentuated here is the relationship between power and knowledge in the act 
of giving testimony and declaring the truth. That these acts of witnessing have effects of power 
and as Sanford states are: “... necessary not simply to reconstruct the past but as an active part of community 
recovery, the regeneration of agency, and to a political project for seeking redress through the accretion of truth.”108 
However, I still find it important to stress, as Hayner does, that tearing up in the past also can 
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have traumatic and negative effects.109 Consequently, I find that in regards to the work of truth 
commissions and the space which can be thought to be created by them, a focus should be kept 
on the set of narratives, and the truth(s), which are produced by these truth commissions and 
how they are objects related to power and, in addition ask, what are the consequences of this 
circumstance?  
 
 
3.3 On the subject of truth and power 
 
The subject of truth is one which is both diffuse, contested and yet again something that is 
often agreed upon. As a consequence, I argue that placing the question of the truth, the 
unveiling of it, at the very core of official investigation is problematic, to say the least, a 
scepticism that I also share with Hayner, who states:  
”I am often surprised by the way in which notions of truth, and notions of truth commissions, are 
initially understood and talked about, and the assumptions that are often held about what a process of truth-
seeking is and what it might lead to.”110  
Met with this statement, I find that what Hayner achieves in her statement is actually to 
question the process in which something as unwieldy as notions of truth are the objects of 
pursuit and production. And this, I argue, might be the central question in regards to truth 
commissions. Since questions on truth(s) in this context can be understood as having inherent 
political dimensions – a dimension which in the production of truth, e.g. through the work of a 
truth commission, becomes even more apparent. For is it not, and as it is stated by Hayner, that 
the: “... terms of reference usually created by presidential decree, national legislation, or as part of a peace accord 
(...) can define a commission’s powers (...) and thus define the truth that will documented.”111  
This again sheds light on a particular characteristic of the narratives produced, since they, 
through the truth documented and created in the framework of the truth commission, are 
actually of a political matter – a political decision often taken by the people in power. In this 
regard one of the most distressing circumstances is that there is no guarantee people will tell the 
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truth, or as stated by Phelps: “Truth commissions, despite the name, can no more guarantee complete truth 
(...) People can and will lie in both settings.”112  
What I want to emphasise is thus that the process of truth-seeking is of a contested political 
nature requiring continuous inquiry. Consequently, the act of telling the truth and the giving of 
testimony to a truth commission is a political act holding an element of power, or as it has been 
suggested by Sanford: “... truth-telling has power beyond the “facts” of the events.”113  
 What I am implying is that a complex relationship between knowledge and power 
exists and that the subject of truth is somehow encompassed herein. As a result, I find that it is 
important to try and decipher the position of truth and its relation to power, and by doing so 
closing in on the characteristics of this relationship. One such effort has been put forth by 
Michel Foucault, an approach which I hold to be very descriptive of this relation, in which it is 
stated that: “... truth isn’t outside power, or lacking in power (...) Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced 
only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power.”114 
To get a better understanding of this relationship, I turn to Foucault and his argument 
concerning the position of truth in society. First of all, this argument presupposes the idea that 
in every society a regime of truth can be found, understood as the ‘general politics of truth’ of 
the given society. Regimes of truth encompass the discourses they accept as true, as well as the 
mechanisms, the means, the techniques and procedures by which they establish what is true, 
and finally they ascertains: ”... the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.”115 
Following this idea, concerning the relation between truth and politics, Foucault points out that 
truth can be perceived as being an ‘political economy’ characterised by a number of traits 
including being an object: “... produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a 
few great political and economic apparatuses (...) lastly, it is the issue of a whole political debate and social 
confrontation”116  
Truth should then be understood as a system of procedures controlling and ordering the: “... 
production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. ‘Truth’ is linked (...) with systems of 
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power (...) and to effects of power...”117 But just as important, in describing the linkages between truth 
and power, Foucault places truth in the middle of a struggle “... a battle ‘for truth’ (...) ‘around 
truth’...”118 Although the struggle, described by Foucault, is not one of bringing about stories of 
the past into the open, but rather one concerning the status of truth, of how the true and false 
are separated as well as the economic and political role it plays119, I will argue that it is possible 
to relate this struggle to one that concerns which truth(s) are allowed and produced by a given 
society.  
What I find that Foucault’s argument provides for is an understanding of how 
truth is directly linked to power and, as a result, I believe that it offers an understanding of how 
testimonies from victims/survivors, through truth commissions, actually are transformed into a 
set of narratives, as well as they are distributed and circulated, and therefore can be thought to 
take on effects of power. And it is from such a viewpoint that I find that the testimonies 
gathered by the REMHI and the CEH can be thought of as a set narratives of truth(s) that 
seeks to challenge the established regime of truth. And it is in exactly in such a context that 
truth can be understood as being akin to systems of power – or as I will rephrase it: Truth 
commissions can be thought of having a role and a position from which they are able to 
challenge the former truth system by building new systems of power – and therefore they 
should be understood as playing very important roles in transition processes.   
As a consequence, I hold that the work of truth commissions to a wide extent, as 
well as the act of giving testimony is tied to power and often have effects of empowerment. 
However, I still find that it should questioned, what it is that these truth commissions offer – or 
as Hayner has pointed out: “For some victims and survivors (...) a truth commission does not so much tell 
them new truth, as much as formally recognize a truth they may already generally know.”120 First of all, I find 
that Hayner is right in pointing out that it is very seldom that new truths appear, and I agree 
that the formal recognition of the already known truths is the primary strength of truth 
commissions. Settling upon such an argument, I believe that the work of truth commissions 
can be approached from at least two positions – firstly, one that, which I have already have 
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tried to emphasise, questions the power connected to these testimonies of violence and 
secondly, one that inquires into the notion of them as existing truths. 
Thinking of these truths as already existing truths seems to imply a number of very 
specific characteristics, not least the notion, which I already have discussed to some extent, that 
they have been silenced and thereby suppressed. And it is exactly from such a pinnacle of 
silenced stories that it seems necessary to try to venture beyond the notion of silence, or at least 
try to approach it from another perspective, so as to inquire if there is more to this silence? 
Closing in on this question I will, although for a short moment, look to Michael Taussig121 and 
his view on truths as being akin to secrets but more specifically as public secrets or, in his own 
words; “... knowing what not to know...”122 I have chosen to emphasise this statement by 
Taussig as it not only offers an understanding of testimonies, these already existing truths that 
Taussig calls public secrets, but even more importantly, because it underlines a very specific 
characteristic of testimonies – the active knowing of what not to know. Consequently, I find 
that this very sentence comes within reach of the very core and nature of the testimonies of 
violence, thereby providing for an understanding of them, as objects emanating from the area 
of tension existing between conflicting truths in Guatemala. 
Furthermore, I argue that by situating the knowledge held within the testimonies as not only 
being secrets, but as public secrets, Taussig touches upon a very important characteristic, which 
I hold to be of great importance, since this allows for an understanding of them as not only 
being of both a polyphonic and collective nature, but as testimonies existing on another plateau 
on which they are tied to a notion of silence, or as Taussig writes: “This reconfiguration of repression 
in which depth becomes surface so as to remain depth, I call the public secret, which, in another version, can 
be defined as that which is generally known, but cannot be articulated...”123  
What I want to question is thus, not least since I find that Taussig also frame some of his 
arguments to a notion of power and knowledge, what happens when this ‘knowing what not to 
know’ becomes public as it did with the reports of the CEH and the REMHI? 
In this regard, it is the distinction of Taussig’s arguments that I find to be of interest and value, 
since for Taussig, it is the knowing of what not to know that is essential: “Knowing it is essential to 
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its power, equal to the denial. Not being able to say anything is likewise testimony to its power.”124 Although 
this is, at first hand, a reverse notion of power and knowledge, I want to argue that the 
seemingly suppressed status of this knowledge also testifies to the accumulated power inherent 
in the testimonies of violence – that is the release of the ‘unsaid’ or of the knowing what not to 
know. 
Thus what I wish to argue is that the CEH and the REMHI can be thought of as actors 
bringing with them knowledge which holds an inherent power, due to its status as suppressed, 
or as Taussig states: “... not that knowledge is power but rather that active not-knowing makes it so.”125, 
and that this knowledge is released with the objective of opposing another regime of truth.  
I am therefore arguing that not only should the relationship between power and knowledge be 
reconsidered, but also that the very discussion on truth commissions is in need of a 
reassessment. To inquire if truth commissions are actually finding new truths or whether their 
role should be understood as a means from which the stories of violence are streaming – and in 
the case of Guatemala as an effort that actively rejects a culture of violence – truth 
commissions as bodies of alternative power?  
 
 
3.4 Testimonies – simulacrums of the past?  
 
Focusing on the struggles of opposing truths, I wish to inquire into what happens when these 
conflicting truth systems meet, or more precisely, what happens when repressed public 
knowledge is released from its ties. Furthermore, I find that this question is of significance 
when considering the circumstance that the reports of truth commission very often seek to 
oppose or reject what can be thought as ‘the old official truth’ in its try to become a new one. 
In this regard testimonies, and the bearing of witness, becomes of such a value that I find it to 
be important to reassess their form and function. I therefore hold that it is necessary to 
descend into this cacophony of voices, while all the time posing questions, not merely on what 
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happened, but in particular on what these testimonies are trying to say and how they can be 
thought of as a new set of narratives regarding the truth. 
Following this line of thought, it becomes clear that it is necessary to look closer at how truth 
commissions, through their narration and reports, provide a way by which the stories 
concerning a violent past are able to resurface. And in doing so I find it to be important to 
question the role narratives are ascribed, or given, in this kind of historical representation. In 
this regard, I believe that the work with testimonies, because of their narrative nature, is 
situated in a controversy that as Hayden White states:  
“... there should be very little to debate about (...) Narration is a manner of speaking as 
universal as language itself (...) But it is precisely because the narrative mode of representation is so natural to 
human consciousness (...) that its use in any field of study aspiring to the status of a science must be suspect.”126  
Indeed there seems to be much debate, not least in regards to testimonies, leading to the 
question on how narratives can be understood. To which White replies: As a form of discourse, 
and not as a product of theory or as the basis for a method127 and goes on:  
“”... the narrative (...) is rather a simulacrum of the structure and processes of real events (...) 
insofar as this representation resembles the events of which it is a representation, it can be taken as a true 
account. The story told (...) is a “mimesis” of the story lived in some region of historical reality...“”128  
By describing the narrative as a “mimesis of the story lived” I find that White succeeds in 
pointing out what also seems to be a distinguishing trait of testimonies – that they represent a 
certain reality being retold. When working with testimonies it is therefore essential to treat them 
with both precision, and the care that their delicate and often vulnerable character prescribes – 
as they are testimonies of violence, mourning, forgiveness and resentment. However, as delicate 
as they are, I still want to stress the importance of the question posed by Paul Ricoeur: “... to 
what point is testimony trustworthy?”129 This is a very justifiable question and one that seems to 
originate from the very nature of narratives: “”The fact that narrative is the mode of discourse common 
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to both “historical” and “non-historical” cultures (...) makes it suspect as a manner of speaking about “real” 
events.””130  
But although this is justifiable, I also hold it to be problematic, since testimonies are not only 
narratives but also memory in the shape of individual recollections of a traumatised past. 
Consequently, I find that it is essential to inquire how testimonies are treated, viewed and 
ultimately understood – as history or memory, are they both, or neither, or should they rather 
be thought of as narrative representations of reality and if so, what does this imply? In regards 
to this White asks:  
 “”How else can any “past” (...) that are considered to be no longer perceivable, be represented in 
either consciousness or discourse except in an imaginary way? Is it not possible that the question of narrative in 
any discussion of historical theory is always finally about the function of imagination in the production of a 
specifically human truth?””131 
And I find that it is exactly on this verge that the testimonies presented in the reports of truth 
commissions often can be thought of as suppressed narratives of the past enmeshed and 
enshrouded in between the realms of history and memory. 
By treating the testimonies as suppressed knowledge, I believe that it is possible to recognise 
the peculiar existence of intertwined knowledge, which might be regarded as both history and 
memory existing on different plateaus, yet still bound together, or as stated by Connerton: “The 
narrative of one life is part of an interconnecting set of narratives...”132   
 I admit that this might not solve the question on trustworthiness or provide an 
answer to when something can count as evidence, seemingly the recurrent challenge of the 
historian, but then again, is it not, as Connerton note, that: “... the historian will [constantly, Ed.] 
need to question that statement if it is to be considered as evidence; and this is the case even if the answer is given 
by an eye-witness or by the person who did what the historian is inquiring into.”133  
The recipient of these testimonies is therefore standing at a crossroad with a sign leading to 
rejection or recognition. This can also be described, as done by Ricoeur, as a dialogical situation 
in which: “... the witness testifies to the reality of some scene of which he was part (...) the witness asks to be 
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believed.”134 And I argue that it is this dimension of trust that testifies to the paradox of truth 
commissions, since it seems to be inevitable that: “Certification of the testimony (...) is not complete 
except through the echo response of the one who receives the testimony and accepts it.”135  
 However, since one of the main objects of this thesis is to focus on how 
testimonies are being transformed into a set of narratives, a kind of public counter narrative, 
that challenge the former ‘official truth’, it seems sufficient, at least for the moment, to state 
that the testimonies in Guatemala: Memory of Silence and Guatemala: Never Again! have been 
accredited as being true – at least by the two commissions. In this regard, I believe that a 
central question concerns the potential of the narratives and here I agree with White’s 
statement that it is: “... the success of narrative in revealing the meaning, coherence, or significance of events 
that attests to the legitimacy of its practice in historiography.”136 From this point of view, the value of 
narratives is that they bridge both the narration of history and how given individuals 
experienced a specific lived past.  
Accepting that this is the value of narratives, I find it possible to move beyond the use of 
narratives as an approach that solely tries to determine what happened and why it happened 
etc. As a result, I find that a question which should be posed inquires into how these 
testimonies, whether true or not, are part of a larger set of narratives. And it is from such a 
viewpoint that I approach the reports of the CEH and REMHI as a new set of narratives that 
challenge and oppose the former power system and the symptoms caused by the conflict in 
Guatemala.  
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4. Guatemala’s Blood - an introduction to conflict in Guatemala  
 
When describing the reality of conflict in Guatemala it is easy to get lost in a labyrinth of 
widespread repression wrought by a line of succeeding dictatorships, not counting the 
seemingly endless row of stories, in which people are raped, tortured, killed or have 
disappeared. The blood of Guatemala has been flowing in a seemingly endless stream, leaving 
its population forever scarred by these traumatic memories of violence.  
The years 1981-83 were a period which saw the most extensive repression and numerous 
massacres. However, this does not mean that violations and killings did not take place before or 
after this period – they did – nevertheless, it is important to understand that what happened 
during this period, was not only a continuation of procedures from a shifting line of dictators, 
but also a turning point in which the violence, that earlier events also seemed to predict, rose to 
unseen levels.  
During this period, the people of Guatemala saw not only three generals; Romeo Lucas García, 
Efraín Ríos Montt and Oscar Humberto Mejía Victores, as presidents of the Republic of 
Guatemala, but it was also during these years that a powerful and influential group of army 
officers sought to win the struggle against the guerrilla groups using all means possible.  
Moreover, it was during these years that what amongst Guatemalans is referred to as the 
‘blackest’ period of their history took place – the period of President Lucas García, July 1978 to 
March 1982.137 A denomination which significance can be ascribed to the events which took 
place during the last twelve months of Lucas García’s rule, where 97 massacres in the El 
Quiche region were carried out claiming as many as 2,495 victims.138  
However, it is just as important to understand that it was this period which chimed the advent 
of the violent repression to come. 
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4.1 The Scorching of the Earth 
 
The spiral of violence, often referred to as La Violencia139, was given birth in the form of a 
counterinsurgency conceived by a group of army officers during the presidency of Lucas 
García, and therefore prior to the coup d’état on 23rd  of March, 1982, and subsequently 
General Efraín Ríos Montt’s ascendance to presidency. What the army feared was that the 
guerrilla, as recounted by Defence Minister Bolaños in a 1990 interview, would soon be able to 
declare a part of the country as liberated territory and thereby gain international recognition as a 
governing body.140 However, it was not until after the coup d’état that the strategy, Plan de 
Campaña Victoria 82141, had fully developed.  
The measures employed in the conflict saw further radicalisation with the burning 
of the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City on 31st of January, 1980, marking a turning point in 
the escalation of the conflict. This incident claimed the lives of thirty-nine people burned alive 
by the police, hereunder members of the guerrilla, as well as embassy personnel raising 
international awareness on the evolving tragedy in Guatemala.142 In July, 1980, the army 
launched an offensive in the Ixil region, the northern part of El Quiche, wiping out the village 
of Cocop, in Nebaj and later on 20th of August, the army publically executed sixty men in the 
village square in San Juan Cotzal.143 The repression persisted into 1981 and these massacres was 
the beginning of what was to become an extensive counterinsurgency resulting in a string of 
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massacres – 64 percent of the army massacres in the entire period of Guatemala’s internal 
armed conflict occurred between June 1981 and December 1982.144  
In July, the Augusto César Sandino Front (FACS)145 succeeded in carrying out a 
series of actions with the help of the local population e.g. blocking a sixty-two mile long stretch 
of the Pan-American Highway. These actions reaffirmed the army in their belief that the 
population was a substantial support base of the guerrilla Ejercíto Guerillero de los Pobres 
(EGP). The response came on 1st of October, 1981, with the army deploying an advance post 
overnight, closing the road between Tecpán and Los Encuentros for an entire day, razing every 
village in the area of the Pan American Highway – burning every home in its wake. As the army 
penetrated into El Quiche it continued to raze homes and burn crops, effectively displacing 
vast numbers of people. Massacres soon followed. In the region of El Quiche alone, the 
onslaught of the army ended up claiming 5,675 Maya victims in the 182 massacres that it 
carried out in the region between March 1981 and March 1983.146    
Taking a closer look at the counterinsurgency, also known as the ‘Scorched Earth’ 
campaign, the REMHI report concludes that the villages was met with different acts of 
repression, according to the level of affiliation with the guerrilla e.g. in some villages speeches 
and threats were given, some were burned to the ground and in others massacres took place.147 
However, it should be noted that these acts where not performed solely by the army but also 
carried out by local groups that sympathised with the army. These groups were given official 
support, and many of them later joined the civil patrols, organised as an integrated part of 
Campaign Plan Victoria 82, known as the Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (PACs).148 The PACs 
became an important instrument of repression and although the majority of its members were 
forced into the patrols, in contrast to those who joined willingly, they took actively part in 19 
percent of the massacres during the Lucas García period, a number, which rose to 41 percent 
under Ríos Montt.149   
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Ironically, this campaign which only meet scattered resistance from the EGP and which above 
all ended up targeting the civil population instead, causing massive internal displacement, 
apparently led: “... more than a few officers to conclude that the guerrillas could win...”150 The civil 
population’s support of the guerrilla, to the extent that it existed, seems to have been a 
determining factor in the army’s assessment of internal security.  
 
 
4.2 The Leviathan’s devouring  
 
On the grounds of wishing to secure the established order and maintain the internal security, 
950 members of the army, headed by General Efraín Ríos Montt, carried out a coup d’état on 
March 23rd 1982. This triumvirate of the apparently fraudulent presidential elections of March 
7th151, in which General Aníbal Guevara had been declared president, was to be yet another 
devastating event for the people of Guatemala, a turning point leading to General Ríos Montt 
declaring himself president of the Republic on June 9th. 
During the unfolding of Ríos Montt’s regime, which became an era especially 
distinguished by continuous massacres, the Constitution of Guatemala was suspended 
immediately together with the declaration of a state of siege in which it was a capital offense to 
“”... betray the nation [or to] act against the integrity of the state“”152, a legal framework was established, 
in which the regime and consequently the army could operate153 and not least was the Plan 
Nacional de Seguridad y Desarrollo (National Plan of Security and Development) conceived.154  
Thus in 1982, the army took definitive steps to develop its new 30/70 percent five-phased 
counterinsurgency strategy, beginning with the Campaign Plan Victoria 82, an offensive that 
aimed at dismantling what the army believed to be the support base of the guerrillas. This was 
the launch of the so-called ‘Beans and Bullets’ campaign – a strategy of repression followed by 
development – 30 percent ‘bullets’ and 70 percent ‘beans’. This counterinsurgency strategy 
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ended up targeting the civilian population and claimed thousands of lives, as well as causing 
internal displacement that tore the country apart, or as it was stated in the campaign plan:  
“”The war must be fought on all fronts: military, political but above all socio-economic. The 
minds of the population are our main target (...) deny the subversives access to the population who constitute their 
social and political support base.... Tactics to be employed: 1. Trick them, 2. Find them, 3. Attack them and 4. 
Annihilate them.””155  
It turned out that it was not only the minds of the population that was being claimed by the 
regime of Ríos Montt – the number of victims per massacre in the years 1981-83 was at its 
highest during Ríos Montt period.156  
Campaign Plan Victoria 82 had been under way during Lucas García’s period but 
it was under Ríos Montt that it developed to its fullest extent. It was a strategy that targeted the 
guerrilla as well as civilians. However, and as it already has been stated, the tragedy of this 
counterinsurgency was that it ended up claiming the lives of thousands of civilians not least 
amongst the Maya population – a fact that leads to the question on who was thought of as 
being the enemy? However, the intentions were quite clear:  
“”Ríos Montt, in his weekly television sermons, called for the need to surgically excise evil from 
Guatemala, and “dry up the human sea in which the guerrilla fish swim””.157 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the CEH arrived at the same conclusion:  
“”... the State’s idea of the “internal enemy”, intrinsic to the National Security Doctrine, became 
increasingly inclusive (...) Victims included men, women and children of all social strata [nevertheless, Ed.] 
the vast majority were Mayans.”158 Additionally, the CEH states that:  
 “... Mayans as a group in several different parts of the country were identified by the Army as 
guerrilla allies (...) in the majority of cases, the identification of Mayan communities with the insurgency was 
intentionally exaggerated by the State...”159 
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The story of repression carried out by the Guatemalan Army and the Government of the 
Republic of Guatemala is therefore one in which the idea of the “internal enemy” ended up 
being a rationale, in the framework of the National Security Doctrine160, at which the state-
apparatus felt obliged to act against what it believed to be a strong insurgency movement. 
However, the internal armed conflict, although heavily affected by it, cannot solely be perceived 
through a cold-war prism.161  
It is an account in which the Guatemalan Army and the Government of the 
Republic of Guatemala, as the dominant power structures, chose to act with measures of 
disproportionately magnitude compared to the force of the insurgency. A response, which 
together with the idea of the “internal enemy” ended up targeting large parts of the civil 
population, in its attempt to repress opposition – facing several forms of opposition,162 whether 
it was the armed insurgency or political, socio-economic and cultural manifestations: “... the 
State opted for the annihilation of those they identified as their enemy.”163  
 
 
4.3 A people caught between two fires? 
 
What I have described is but a few of the harsh realities of the Guatemalan conflict – a reality 
of violence that held Guatemala in a strangling grasp for nearly four decades. In doing so, I 
have focused on the terrifying rule of the Guatemalan Army that succeeded in holding onto 
power by the use of structural violence which above all targeted the civilian population.  
The civilian population of Guatemala is often being said to have been caught between the so-
called ‘two fires’ the counterinsurgency of the military and the insurgency of the guerrillas.164 
However, while it is true that the conflict can be understood as a part of the Cold War, the 
immediate paradox is that the civilian population, and especially the Mayan population, ended 
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up being categorised as the internal enemy of the state. Thus a devastating characteristic of the 
counterinsurgency is that it turned on its people:  
“”Everyone, everyone was a guerrilla; no difference was made in killing them. The big 
difference” in the shift in strategy after the 1982 coup “was that we couldn’t eliminate them all””165  
Or as it has been more sharply stated: “The objective of these operations, however, was only 
secondarily to fight the rebels: most of those killed were unarmed civilians fleeing the army and thus considered, by 
definition, subversivos.”166 
The story of violence in Guatemala is thus one of horrific deeds taking place across the country 
in a frenzy that was as intentional as it was violent or as it has been phrased: “How massive and 
excessive does the killing have to be before it is recognized as intentional policy?”167 It is thus a tale of events 
that claimed thousands of innocent lives while countless others fled into the mountains, jungles 
and neighbouring Mexico.   
However, there is no reason to doubt that the Cold War played a significant role in the conflict 
and that these two so-called fires of the Cold War played a part in the conflict. Still the fact 
remains that it was the civilian population that suffered the most in a conflict that, although it 
might have begun on the grounds of Cold War ideology, at some point in its tremendous 
growth ended up claiming innocent lives in the name of counterinsurgency.  
 
 
4.4 The genocide argument 
 
In its report, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, the CEH concludes that: “... agents of the State of 
Guatemala, within the framework of counterinsurgency operations carried out between 1981 and 1983, 
committed acts of genocide against groups of Mayan people...”168 The CEH based its argument upon the 
evidence it found, and additionally refers to Article II, first paragraph of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General 
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Assembly on 9th of December 1948169:“”... that all these acts were committed “with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part” groups identified by their common ethnicity, by reason thereof, whatever the cause, motive or 
final objective of these acts may have been.””170  
As stated earlier, I will not discuss the genocide argument further, however, I find 
it interesting to note that although the commission had no mandate to prosecute, trial or 
punish, it was still able to recommend that the Government of the Republic of Guatemala in 
accordance with the Law of National Reconciliation fulfilled its obligations and demanded that: 
““Those crimes for whose commission liability is not extinguished by the said law, should be prosecuted, tried 
and punished, particularly following Article 8 “crimes of genocide, torture and forced displacement...””171 
However, just as important is the fact that the CEH notes that the judicial system is one of the 
greatest structural weaknesses of the Guatemalan State, which undeniably contributes to a 
widespread perception of impunity.172 In the introduction of its recommendations, the CEH 
refers to one of three objectives outlined in the Accord of Oslo, stating that it should: 
 ““Formulate specific recommendations to encourage peace and national harmony in Guatemala 
(...) in particular, measures to preserve the memory of the victims, to foster a culture of mutual respect and 
observance of human rights and to strengthen democratic process.””173  
From this perspective, the work of the CEH encompasses a dimension in which 
the genocide is treated and acknowledged. However, equally as noteworthy is the ambition to 
go beyond proving genocide. In seeking reconciliation and countering impunity it recommends 
measures, although not solely relying on this dimension, for the preservation of the memory of 
victims/survivors. 
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4.5 Guatemala - the reign of impunity 
 
After the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996, one of the most serious challenges in the 
transition process seems to have been overcoming an omnipresent experience of impunity.174 
This challenge is continuously confronted, but it has proven hard to overcome, and so 
widespread impunity still persists.175 In a report on the situation in Guatemala, it is noted that:  
“Guatemala held national elections amid record violence in 2007, with more than 50 candidates, 
activists, and their relatives killed during the campaign (...) former dictator Efrain Rios Montt, who was wanted 
in Spain on genocide charges, won a congressional seat and its attendant immunity from prosecution.”176 
Thus it is clear that the question of impunity is still one of the most prevalent 
hardships that Guatemala and its population are confronted with. A reality that leads to the 
question: How can impunity still persist? The case of Efrain Ríos Montt serves as one of the 
most noteworthy examples of this impunity. In July 2003, following violent demonstrations 
staged by supporters of the party Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG), a ruling by the 
Constitutional Court allowed Ríos Montt to run for president. In doing so the Constitutional 
Court disregarded an earlier ruling from 1995 that had banned Ríos Montt’s candidacy to the 
presidential elections. This ruling was carried out in reference to the Constitution of Guatemala 
which prohibits that an individual, who has gained power through a military coup, can run for 
president.177 And it is this reality of impunity that, as it has been stated, leaves massacre 
survivors to:  
“… have little reason to believe that the power of Ríos Montt to exterminate their communities 
has diminished, given that he has an omnipresent political party with propaganda throughout Maya 
communities...”178  
However, what I find to be the most distressing concern is that the case of Ríos Montt very 
clearly signifies how widespread impunity is in Guatemala. Furthermore, this impunity seems to 
go hand-in-hand with a rate of violence that, although dropping from 17 murders a day in 2006 
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to 14.5 in 2007179, makes Guatemala one of Latin America’s most violent countries, and as a 
report states: “… the continued practice of lynching, mutilation, torture, and political assassinations – carried 
out by plainclothes security forces, angered mobs, gangs, and other groups – has shocked the country.”180 
And it is in this environment of post-conflict that the challenge of Guatemala, and confronting 
the impunity, is one which to a large extent can be thought to hold questions in regards to 
facing the past, and with it, the violence that has caused great fissures to erupt in the social, 
political, cultural and the very physical landscape of Guatemala.  
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5. An introduction to the analysis  
 
I have already provided an introduction to both the REMHI project and the CEH (See 1. “No 
Comments”). However, as an introduction to the following analysis, I find that it is of importance 
to include a brief introduction to their structure, as well as provide a discussion on some of the 
notions that I believe characterise the REMHI report.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that I intend to deal with the reports in a twofold analysis, that 
emphasises the REMHI report as an alternative take on the work with truth-seeking, especially 
focusing on the testimonies provided herein, while dealing with the CEH report with the aim to 
clarify how I am of the conviction that these commissions are not only dealing with the past. 
Thus, it is first and foremost through an analysis of the testimonies found in the REMHI 
report that I try to address the question of how they constitute an alternative representation of 
the past. As a result, I am arguing that these testimonies do not only shed light on what 
happened in the past, but even more importantly, they allow for an understanding of 
testimonies as part of a process in progress, a process that might be understood as a contested 
effort of development in Guatemala. 
Both the CEH as well as the REMHI project base their reports on the taking of 
testimonies. As I have already mentioned (See 1. “No Comments”) the REMHI project began its 
investigation before the CEH and was originally thought as a support to this commission.  
The REMHI report is build upon a framework of testimonies, and the analysis thereof. The 
English version of the report consists of four parts: 1) The Impact of the Violence 2) The 
Methodology of Horror 3) The Historical Context and 4) The Victims of the Conflict. 
Additionally, it provides a chapter with general statistics, as well as its recommendations. The 
REMHI report initially tried to go beyond the mandate of the CEH e.g. by naming individuals 
that had carried out violence. However, out of fear for the people who had provided testimony, 
the REMHI report ended up doing this in a very few cases.181 Nevertheless, the REMHI 
project, basing its results on 5465 testimonies, succeeded in registering over 52,427 victims and 
more than 25,123 murders, while attributing 89.65 percent of the violations to the State of 
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Guatemala (including the army, police forces, civil patrollers, military commissioners, and death 
squads) and 4.81 percent to the URNG.182  
In contrast the CEH gathered over 8000 testimonies183, as well as, it benefited from the 
research of the REMHI and the CIIDH (See 1. “No Comments”). The CEH report is structured 
in accordance with the objectives and terms of the mandate as outlined in the Accord of 
Oslo.184  
The English version of the report includes two of the most important elements of the entire 
report: the conclusions and the recommendations. The conclusions, which are based on the 
testimonies, are structured into: 1) general conclusions 2) conclusions regarding acts that 
constitute violations of human rights and acts of violence and 3) conclusions related to peace 
and reconciliation. Additionally, it includes annexes in which a chronology over the 
governments of Guatemala, the armed confrontation, basic maps and statistical information are 
found.185   
In regards to the recommendations, these are structured as: 1) measures to preserve the 
memory of the victims including recommendations for reparations 2) measures to foster a 
culture of mutual respect and observance of human rights 3) measures for the strengthening of 
the democratic process and 4) measures for the promotion of peace and national harmony.186 
On the basis of the investigations the CEH estimated that approximately 200,000 people had 
been killed or disappeared during the conflict while estimating the number of internally 
displaced people from 500,000 to 1.5 million in the period of 1981-83. It also documented that 
658 massacres had taken place and ended up attributing 93 percent of the violations to the 
Guatemalan Army and 3 percent to the URNG.187 
After this brief introduction it is clear that the two commissions and their 
approaches, and results, might be thought to overlap each other. And further, both 
commissions perceived the taking of testimonies as a crucial factor in their investigation. 
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However, the fundamental difference, if the question of support and funding is disregarded, 
seems to be that the REMHI project was initiated by the Guatemalan Archdiocesan Human 
Rights Office (ODHAG) while the CEH was administered by the United Nations. As a result, I 
find it important to focus on the REMHI’s use of certain notions, not least the use martyrdom, 
which seems to originate from this circumstance. And by doing so, I hope to provide a 
discussion from which it is possible to better understand the alternative character of the 
REMHI project vis-à-vis the CEH as a representative of an more traditional truth commission. 
 
  
5.1 An alternative truth commission  
 
The report of the REMHI project is not solely a report of a truth commission, on the contrary, 
it is much more. It is, and as already stated, a report carried out by the Catholic Church of 
Guatemala through one of its own organs, the Archdiocesan Human Rights Office (ODHAG), 
but the consequences of this relation are not very clear.  
 As already stated, I intend to focus on the testimonies which are presented in the 
REMHI report, however, I find it just as important to discuss the statements and objectives 
given, and here those who especially figure in the foreword and introduction, by the people 
involved in the project. Furthermore, I am addressing this subject since it is my belief that these 
statements provide for an understanding of how these people perceived their own work. And it 
is by doing so that I am arguing that the report might be thought as being more than a 
collection of testimonies addressing a violent past. 
In this regard, the foreword by Thomas Quigley, together with the speech by Bishop 
Monsignor Juan Gerardi Conedera and the introductory remarks by Monsignor Próspero 
Penados Del Barrio, Archbishop Primate of Guatemala, are of particular interest, since they all 
contain very strong statements in which I find their use of notions on martyrdom, together 
with the statements on rebuilding and reconstructing society, of particular interest. Concerning 
the notion of martyrdom, it is important to note that the foreword begins with the following 
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sentence by Thomas Quigley: “This is a book of martyrs, a martyrology. It is an account, not exhaustive 
but fully representative, of the suffering and death of a martyred people...”188  
As a result, the notion of martyrdom is a characteristic which marks the report 
from the very beginning and is, furthermore, even more evident in the introductory remarks by 
Archbishop Próspero Penados Del Barrio:  
“We regarded it as a contribution to peace and reconciliation that involved acknowledging the 
suffering of the people (...) and bearing witness to their martyrdom so as to honor the memory of the dead and 
restore the self-esteem of their relatives.”189 
Met with such statements, I find it important to delve on the figure of the martyr, and discuss 
how understanding certain characteristics about this figure enables an approach, although it 
might be thought provoking, on how bearing witness is not only an act of martyrs. The 
intention being to highlight how the suffering, arguably the very power of martyrs, which the 
Guatemalan people endured actually are stories of resistance. In doing so, I am arguing that by 
perceiving the Guatemalan people as martyrs, the REMHI project, at least to some extent, is 
juxtaposing these tales of suffering with the ones endured by classical martyrs. 
From such a perspective, it is important to understand the context in which the 
early martyrs found themselves, and what might be understood as martyrdom in its classical 
context.190 And in this regard it is essential to look upon their meeting with death, since it 
allows for a perception of how martyrdom, and the suffering connected to it, can be 
understood: “Death was only of the body (...) never of the soul; for the martyr’s heroic death recapitulated 
Christ’s paradoxical victory on the Cross and anticipated the resurrection...”191 This conviction was 
merged with an ideal of passivity and succeeded in promoting a “... redefined heroic behaviour (...) A 
Christian glorified in suffering for its own sake, for this imitated the passion of Christ...”192 
 Met with this notion of passivity, it is important to recognise that it is by passivity, 
as well as through suffering, that the Christian martyr is able to transcend the very same 
suffering wrought upon them by their torturer. What can be thought of as the power of 
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passivity is here tied to a kind of power of truth, and it is these characteristics which enabled 
the martyrs, through: “”Their possession of the truth [which, Ed.] would necessarily generate a greater 
power and ability by bearing witness in this terrible new style of “active” suffering.””193, to become agents of 
testimony and truth. And it is this act that I believe the REMHI juxtapose with the widespread 
repression that numerous Guatemalans faced and endured. As a consequence, I find that the 
REMHI situate the Guatemalan people, through their suffering, as active bearers of testimony. 
The act of bearing witness, recounting the experiences of both the deceased and survivors as 
well as the atrocities they faced, becomes acts of martyrdom.  
What I am arguing is therefore that the connotations extending from this 
comparison are of great importance. And as a result, I believe that an essential question is how 
the testimonies, and the truth(s) they contain, gathered by the REMHI can be thought of as a 
set of narratives not only focusing on the perspectives of forgiveness and reconciliation but 
also, through the act of giving witness, is a set of narratives that “... as the people’s utter and 
unequivocal rejection of the culture of violence.”194, opposes the violence of the past. 
 
 
5.2 Resisting the violent past 
 
From the notions of martyrdom, I turn to the statements concerning the restructuring and 
rebuilding of society. To begin with, the importance of these statements is not least that they 
allow for an understanding of how the notion of martyrdom is merged into a framework of 
narratives that seemingly sets out to change the Guatemalan society: “... above all, it is an account 
of the indomitable spirit of a people who have risen from the depths of unimaginable suffering and are seeking to 
refashion their society along the paths of peace, justice, and reconciliation. It is a book of hope.”195  
 In this proclamation, suffering and the refashioning of society is merged in to an 
objective of reconciliation. Faced with this statement, I am arguing that, instead of focusing 
directly on the notion of reconciliation, it might be more prudent to focus on the aim to 
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refashion society. Not least since the restructuring of society is a subject that also resonates in 
the speech of Bishop Monsignor Juan Gerardi Conedera:  
“”... many people react by saying, “Why does the church get involved into this?” (...) the church 
has a mission to accomplish in terms of constructing the social order, and that includes ethical, moral and 
evangelical values.””196 And further: “We are collecting the people’s memories because we want to contribute to 
the construction of a different country.”197 
An identical reasoning is found in the statements of Archbishop Próspero 
Penados Del Barrio: “... the task of repairing the fabric (...) begins by discerning the truth.”198 Adding: “It 
is now time to face the truth in order to morally rebuild our society.”199 
 I therefore find that it is possible to understand the REMHI as a project, which 
through its report not only deals with atrocities of the past but also as a pursuit of the 
reconstruction of Guatemalan society. A circumstance which is even more evident in the 
following statement:  
“... society as a whole must engage in a process of reflection (...) in order to enter into a period of 
transformation (...) For this transformation to be genuine, however, we all – each sector of society – must 
acknowledge our faults...”200 And further: “... we can do no less than hope that by renouncing this dark past 
of horror, and with our determination to rebuild our country, a new climate of hope will emerge...”201 
Thus the REMHI report situates itself on the verge between past and present, 
while calling for each individual’s acknowledgement of their own fault – the renouncement of 
horror and the rebuilding of Guatemala. However, what I find to be particularly interesting is 
that this renouncement and rejection of a culture of violence is actually resisting that the violent 
past is forgotten. So although the REMHI emphasises reconciliation, and forgiveness, it also 
takes a strong stance towards the atrocities: “It is ethically and morally imperative that the acts of 
Guatemala’s recent past never again come to pass.”202  
In line with these statements, I am arguing that the rejection of “the culture of violence” is just 
as much an absolute demand of the REMHI as its calls for reconciliation and forgiveness, and 
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as a consequence, I perceive the aspect of resistance as central for the understanding of the 
REMHI report. Following this argument it becomes necessary, not least because they seem to 
be intertwined with the questions of forgiveness and reconciliation in this same environment of 
post-conflict, to approach these notions of renouncement or question, as Thomas Brudholm 
does, why: “”…little interest is left for considerations of the possible value and legitimacy of victims’ “negative” 
emotions.””203 
This focus is both interesting and challenging, and while Brudholm emphasise that: “… the 
refusal to forgive and the preservation of resentment can be pathological and morally unjustifiable.”  It is still 
argued that: “… it is necessary to examine more closely the moral nature and value of victims’ (...) 
preservation of resentment after genocide and other massive crimes against humanity.”204 
I find that the approach of Brudholm holds significant value in the context of the work done 
by the REMHI and the CEH since it considers the strong emotions that often are found in the 
testimonies of victims/survivors.205  
It is through an analysis of writings by Holocaust survivor Jean Améry that Brudholm tries to 
consider the value of resentment and thereby adding to our understanding of how 
victims/survivors might not always perceive the establishment and work of truth commissions 
as a fulfilling, or even sufficient, response to atrocities of the past, or as Améry states: “”What 
happened, happened. But that it happened cannot be so easily accepted. I rebel: against my past, against history, 
and against a present that places the incomprehensible in the cold storage of history...””206  
Although I will not go into a further discussion of truth commissions, and their 
ability to provide fulfilling responses to mass atrocities, I find that there in the statement of 
Améry is a negative response, the refusal to accept, that stands in sharp contrast with the kind 
of reconciliatory work done by truth commissions. However, at the same time this response 
resonates with the abovementioned rejection of “the culture of violence” and the statement of 
“never again”. The question which is left standing is then how this resistance towards the 
violence of the past can be understood? Is it not possible to think of it as a response and an act 
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that expresses the distressing conditions that these survivors of past atrocities are faced with? 
Or as Brudholm, in his discussion of Améry’s views, states:  
“”The surviving victim cannot “move on” in/with a society that has not recognized the moral 
horror of the crime committed in its name and which has been tolerated by the masses. It is not only a question of 
the recognition and responsibility for the past, but also of the survivor’s fear that it could happen again.””207 
Faced with this statement, I ask if it is not exactly such a void of insecurity some 
victims/survivors might feel consigned to in the aftermath of violent conflict? And further is 
the REMHI not approaching this distressing environment in much the same way: 
“Those directly involved in the armed conflict and the dirty war must acknowledge openly their 
errors and excesses and ask for forgiveness for their crimes against innocent victims” and as earlier noted: “... 
we all - each sector of society - must acknowledge our faults...”208  
Is this not also a resistance extraordinaire and is it not familiar to Améry’s resentment, which he 
claims will persist until its vision is attained? A vision which, as Brudholm notes, craves for:  
“… a societywide reformation catalyzed—fantastically—by the victims’ articulation of their 
ressentiment...”209 or as Améry state: “Only through it would our ressentiment be subjectively pacified and 
have become objectively unnecessary.”210  
Améry gives no quarter, and leaves very little room for forgiveness and reconciliation, which is 
why his notion on resentment might not be directly compared to the resistance against the 
violence of the past of which the REMHI project are strong advocates.  
Nevertheless, when reconsidering the full statement of their rejection: “Those directly and indirectly 
responsible for the suffering must read and interpret these findings as the people’s utter and unequivocal rejection 
of the culture of violence”211, together with the following words of Bishop Monsignor Juan Gerardi 
Conedera: 
“Peace is possible – a peace that is born from the truth that comes from each one of us and from 
all us (...) It is a truth that challenges each one of us to recognize our individual and collective responsibility and 
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to commit ourselves to action so that those abominable acts never happen again.”212, it still seems that the 
stance taken by the REMHI project at least to some extent bears resemblance to Améry’s 
statement. 
However, the REMHI project, unlike to Améry, still emphasise reconciliation; “We 
are called to reconciliation.”213, and thereby avoid entering into the same abyss Améry did in which 
he proclaimed: “I know that the time-sense of the person trapped in resentment is twisted around, dis-ordered, 
if you wish, for it desires two impossible things: regression into the past and nullification of what happened.”214  
Consequently, it could be argued that the REMHI project is still left on the brink between 
reconciliation and utter resentment. And while this might bear some truth, it also seems to be 
the case that a merger between the two standpoints is possible. The point being that although 
the REMHI project, as well as the CEH, produced their reports with reconciliation as a goal, 
they can also be thought of as constituting a set of narratives which both rejects and renounces 
the violence, and by doing offers resistance towards the oppressors of the past and present.  
To return to the main argument, it is these notions of resistance and rejection of 
the culture of violence that in Guatemala: Never Again! merges with the notion of martyrdom and 
why I believe that the REMHI report, not least through the providing of testimony – the 
bearing of witness, is not only a call for reconciliation but also one of resistance towards the 
distressing situation of the victims/survivors. What I am proposing is thus that the REMHI 
project is not only trying to shed light on the violent past of Guatemala but that its report 
might also be thought of as a set of narratives which by dealing with the stories of violence sets 
out to change, to reconstruct, the Guatemalan society: “... our commitment is also to return these 
collected memories to the people (...) It must return to its birthplace and support the use of memory as an 
instrument of social reconstruction...” 215  
It is from such a perspective that I will descend into a discussion on the testimonies, although 
not treating all of them, included in the REMHI report in an effort aiming to clarify how it 
creates a narrative, by which it tries to promote change and the restructuring of the Guatemalan 
society. On the basis of this discussion, I then turn to the conclusions and recommendations of 
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the CEH, as the official inquiry into the atrocities of the past, with the intention to focus on 
how these two truth commissions can be perceived as actors, promoting processes related to 
questions on state formation, in post-conflict Guatemala.  
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6. A Violent Silence  
 
As I approach the testimonies presented in Guatemala: Never Again! I focus on how this report 
can be perceived as an effort taking place in what can be thought of as a space of post-conflict 
state formation. In this regard, I focus is on the question of narrative, since I believe that it is 
by way of narrative that the REMHI project is entering into this space. 
Consequently, the following analysis should be understood as both a dissection of parts of the 
REMHI report, as well as it can be argued to be a reconstruction, an operation that enables 
inquiries into the character of this narrative and the story the REMHI is trying to tell in its 
effort to promote change. 
As I have already touched upon, a central discussion in the work of truth 
commission concerns the notion of silence (See 3.2 Recovering of voices – storytelling as space?) and 
in regards to the narrative of the REMHI report, I find it interesting how this notion is bound 
to the violence which took place in Guatemala. The narrative is a story of the violence wrought 
under this cape of silence, hence the violence of the silence, and thus, I think of it as a narrative 
of violent silence. However, I will argue that it is just as important to understand that this 
violent silence not only represents the violence already committed, but that it can be considered 
as violence in itself – that this silence actually constitutes a form of violence – and is a 
syndrome of the conflict in Guatemala. As a result, this analysis focus on the violence and with 
it the void that, understood by the REMHI as silence, seems to have consumed society in 
Guatemala. The intention is to illustrate how the REMHI is not only providing a space for 
these testimonies, but even more central to this analysis, how the REMHI transforms the 
testimonies into a narrative of violent silence. This narrative concerns both past and the present 
as well as it portrays the distressing environment in which the testimonies are given, a situation 
in which the act of bearing witness, is often is seen as a risk: “What if death comes for me after this 
interview, tomorrow or the next day? I want to live with my family. That is why I’m afraid; and I’m concerned 
about discussing what happened during those years.”216 
 I hold the statement given through this testimony to be quite symptomatic for the 
fear contained within many of the accounts gathered by the REMHI. And it is this feeling of 
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fear which allows for a better understanding of the REMHI’s emphasis of silence: “You couldn’t 
speak or say anything. There were constant calls for silence, to keep from discussing anything.”217 And: “They 
terrified you, and so you felt humiliated. You couldn’t say anything.”218 
As a consequence I find that fear can be seen is a recurring symptom in the 
testimonies collected by the REMHI. A fear that is transformed into silence and which together 
with the experience of violence can be thought of as leading notions in the narrative of the 
REMHI: “Well the truth is, a feeling of powerlessness, at that moment in front of those corpses, because it was 
overwhelming. And the people stood there, no one said a word (...) Everyone was paralyzed, terrified.”219 
However, before turning to the stories of violence I believe that the objective of 
change, put forth by the REMHI, should be questioned. Since by doing so, it is possible to 
understand that the REMHI is actively opposing the Cold War infused notion that placed the 
civilian population between the so-called ‘two fires’ – between the military and the guerrillas 
(See 4.3 A people caught between two fires?), or as it states:  
“People joined the insurgency out of their desire to bring about a more just society and the 
impossibility of accomplishing it through the established system. This went beyond those seeking to install a 
socialist state to include – many without being Marxists or espousing a particular political position – became 
convinced by, and felt compelled to support, a movement that seemed to represent the only possible path: armed 
struggle.”220 
 While the REMHI does not deny that the Cold War affected the conflict in 
Guatemala, that it was touched by Cold War politics and ideologies, it still argues that the roots 
of the conflict spurred from living conditions, in which the vast majority was deprived of basic 
needs such as access to food, health, education, housing, a fair wage, the right to organise, 
respect for political opinions etc.221 I am therefore arguing that by focusing on the notion of 
violent silence, as well as understanding the abovementioned position of the REMHI and what 
it is opposing, contributes to a better understanding of what the REMHI project tries to bring 
about. 
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6.1 Paralysis  
 
Before embarking into the memorial wastelands of violence, I will turn my attention to the 
testimonies describing fear, and with it silence, and thereafter I focus upon the stories of 
violence. By doing so, I am trying to provide an understanding of the distressing environment 
that prevailed in Guatemala during the conflict and which to some extent persists today, as well 
as devote attention to the violence. 
Throughout the REMHI report, violence is being described as causing a fear that often have 
left the victim/survivor in a state in which the given individual was unable to act:  
“In that moment I had thoughts against them; that I am somebody: I am capable of doing 
something to one of them (...) Of course if I do something, we’ll all be killed, including my family, so I decided to 
restrain myself.”222 
This statement is imbued with fear; however, a dilemma is also presented: The witness actually 
felt compelled to react but decided, out of fear for his family’s safety, not to do anything. This 
seems to be a recurring response in regards to the reaction patterns following violence: 
 “Since at that time, the dead were beginning to appear, people were extremely afraid and began to 
withdraw.”223  
These two testimonies, together with the aforementioned, are telling a story of withdrawal – of 
societal paralysis. They make it possible to understand that it is in the meeting with violence 
that these individuals, out of fear, felt that they were forced to keep silent, or as it is stated by 
another witness: 
“Everything goes on as usual in our community, as if nothing had happened. What happened is 
that the authorities at the time threatened us, and all the disappearances, and massacres have gone 
unreported.”224 
Furthermore, this testimony depicts the distressful circumstances in which numerous 
victims/survivors are still bound. A climate in which people are held in a constant grip of fear, 
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or as it is described: “No one went to bed and we stayed there together throughout that night. In the morning, 
we were sad and exhausted from lack of sleep; all the people were terrified.”225  
And it is testimonies such as these that I find provide an understanding of what the REMHI 
describes as silence. A state in which the victims/survivors are so touched by fear that they 
recline into what might be described as passiveness or silence – a state which I argue can be 
thought of as a kind of paralysis – as it is the effective deadlock of victims/survivors, 
communities and as a result hereof the society. It is a state, in which some victims/survivors are 
still held by the very persistence of their fear, and yet others are caught in desperation caused by 
a need to tell what happened:  
 “I wanted to tell you this, about what hurt me so terribly (...) And sometimes I even get – I 
don’t know how this resentment wells up in me and who to retaliate against sometimes.”226 
And it is this state, this paralysis, which I find that the REMHI is trying to oppose, and by 
doing so reacting to similar acts of resistance, that can be found in the testimonies collected 
e.g.: 
  “I want to denounce it nationally and internationally, so it all comes out clearly. Like a story 
written down on paper that relates everything that happened…”227 and another: “They still come to intimidate 
(…) And this cannot be and I would be willing to say so, but the problem is that I can’t speak Spanish very 
well.”228  
Moreover, it is testimonies such as these that I find describe the syndrome of violent silence – 
these settings in which both silence and of violence are present – a syndrome which I find that 
the REMHI project is opposing. 
 
 
6.2 Descending into the past of violence 
 
If it is accepted that there is an intimate relation between the fear, this silence and the violence, 
as it is suggested by the REMHI, it seems that to better understand this syndrome, the 
massiveness of the violence must first be recognised.  
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The focus on violence, and how it affected the people of Guatemala, is emphasised already in 
the introduction of the REMHI report:  
“The army strategy was to militarize the social fabric (...) Militarized structures dominated the 
daily life of every village or neighbourhood, trampling local values and culture (...) People’s lives were transformed 
into a battleground.”229 
The very notion of civilian lives as being ‘battlegrounds’ not only situates violence at the very 
core of conflict, but also as constituting the very syndrome which the REMHI so strongly 
oppose: 
 “... future atrocities must be prevented by abolishing systems and ideologies that make obedience a 
virtue and countenance horror as a means of attaining social objectives.”230 
Thus when faced with the following words of Bishop Monsignor Juan Gerardi Conedera: “... 
the REMHI project is a legitimate and painful denunciation...” 231 it should be understood that the 
REMHI is denouncing the very omnipresence of violence in Guatemala. And that it is with this 
intention and from such a stance that the REMHI turns to the testimonies of violence, while 
emphasising that: 
 “The search for truth does not end here. It must return to its birthplace and support the use of 
memory as an instrument of social reconstruction...”232 
Confronted with such a statement I find myself asking: What is this truth and what is this 
memory – or rephrasing the question: What is Guatemala: Never Again!? To begin with, I believe 
that the answer also seems to be its very cause: violence and with it suffering and trauma: 
“When we got there, oh, but it was horrible. I can’t forget it. Even though some say you have to 
put the past behind you, I can’t. I remember…we went to the kitchen and there was the whole family, my aunt, 
my daughter-in-law, her sons and daughters; there were two little children hacked to pieces with machetes. They 
were still alive.””233 
Within this testimony, a narration of an outburst of violence as well as the following trauma is 
retold, and as such this testimony is quite descriptive of those included in the REMHI report, 
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the merging of violence and trauma. However, the testimonies also bear witness to the 
hopelessness of the situation, the paralysis, in which the victims/survivors are caught:  
 “The ones who died there rotted. There they remained. No one collected them; no one buried them. 
Because they said that anyone who picked them up or went to see them would be killed right there. Whoever 
buried them was one of them (…) There is a constant ache in my heart, and I always think of the violence they 
endured.”234 
It is this ‘constant aching’, this notion of suffering, which might be thought of as what actually 
binds these testimonies together in a set of narratives which, by recounting the atrocities of the 
past, seeks to denounce the violence: 
 “It must be exposed to get relief (…) We have already suffered our history in the flesh; we don’t 
want these events to happen again.”235  
As it is seen in this testament I will argue that this belief, that the exposure of past atrocities will 
bring relief, presuppose not only an inherent ability of healing, through the act of giving 
testimony, but also a notion of power – that exposing the violence will led it to its end. 
Likewise, it could be argued that the REMHI project is actually resting on a similar principle by 
which it tries to prevent the recurrence of violence.  
Arriving at such a conclusion I believe that I am closing in on the centre of the REMHI project 
– a centre in which I also find, in the wish to expose the violence, the closely related question 
of whether there was a genocide in Guatemala or not. Although not delving further into this 
question I do find that the exposure of violence is relevant in regards to the narrative of the 
REMHI. Thus, when closing in on this narrative, I wish to emphasise how the REMHI report 
not only focuses on violence and silence but also on what is believed to constitute a certain 
pattern of violent repression:  
“Counterinsurgency violence targeted entire communities, including noncombatant civilians and 
even children (...) characterized by recurrent patterns of action and acquired specific common traits in different 
regions. (...) All of these forms of violence (...) include certain aspects of genocide.”236  
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As a result, I find that in the attempt to understand the narrative of the REMHI, it is important 
to look into how this pattern of violence, and here especially violence towards women and 
children, is presented:  
“Children, as a social group have been deeply affected by violence and political repression (...) 
Soldiers and civil patrollers killed many children directly between 1980 and 1983 (...) And because they tended 
to remain close to their mothers, violence against women is often associated with violence against children.”237 
By emphasising the violence against women and children, the REMHI report touches upon a 
very sensitive subject, and I will argue that this adds a certain fragile dimension to the narrative: 
 “The army’s plan was to get rid of the seeds. Even if it was a little one- or two-year-old child, 
they are all bad seeds, so they say. This was the army’s plan. This is what I have seen.”238 
By emphasising this intentionality the narrative is an account of systematic assaults carried out 
by the Government of the Republic of Guatemala and its army. And it is the testimonies of 
these assaults, although I am not disregarding the violence against the male population, which 
are especially characteristic of this narrative on violence in Guatemala: 
 “I was playing there when I saw the soldiers coming up. As they came, my mother told me to run 
(...) I ran alone along the coffee bushes, and my mother did not follow me. At about four o’clock in the afternoon, 
I went back to the village. They had already burned the house and my family. No one was left.”239 
What these testimonies bears witness to is first of all the sheer destructiveness of the violence 
and the traumas it left: 
 “I feel it deep in my heart. I have no one left. My parents are dead, and I feel as if I have a knife 
in my heart. We have been dragging the dead; we had to bury them in our fright (…) The bodies were not 
together; they were scattered all over, lost on the mountain.”240 
Thus the REMHI report is not only opposing the violence but also the persistence of the 
traumas, the silence in which they have been kept, and by doing so it confronts the violent 
silence that has left the victims/survivors marked: 
“I still dream; I still see it. Because my heart is still afflicted by the persecution. Because they have 
pointed their guns at us. And this means that I am still deeply distressed by everything we have suffered. What 
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do they do to the children? They cut them into pieces. I mean, they cut them up with machetes; they cut them into 
pieces.”241   
Furthermore, this violence against children is closely related to the atrocities committed against 
women, or as it is being stated by a perpetrator: 
 “The children saw everything they did to their mothers, their sisters, and their other family 
members; and afterward they killed them too.”242  
And further: “They took her little boy from her and they all raped her. It was a gang rape. 
Afterward, I told them to kill the woman first. So she wouldn’t feel so bad about the death of her son.”243 
Although I am appalled by the acts of violence retold in these statements, I find that it is the 
bluntness by which they are put forth that stands out as particularly shocking. It is all the more 
frustrating that such atrocities seem to have been recurring patterns of abuse:  
“He raped the little one and then left her for the others (…) I didn’t like participating in that 
shit because, after you do it, you fell all weak with no desire to do anything. But they didn’t care, and afterward 
they killed them…”244 
Furthermore, numerous testimonies bear witness to continuous acts in which pregnant women 
were killed in acts of extreme violence:  
“They took the baby out of the woman. She was alive and they took out the child she was 
expecting, in front of her husband and her children. And the woman and her children died too. They killed the 
others…”245 
These testimonies situate the narrative directly in the act of violence. And it is exactly this 
circumstance that I will argue is characteristic of the power of this narrative – that the 
testimonies, in their merger, are so intimate and so fraught with the distress caused by the 
violence that they seemingly are able to bring back the violence of the past into the present. 
And I ask: Does this situation not bear some resemblance to Phelps’ notion of storytelling as 
carnival? Is it not in such a situation, between the narrator and the recipient, that a less 
constrained space evolves and temporarily obliterates the established order offering room for 
these otherwise restrained memories? (See 3.2 Recovering of voices - storytelling as space?). And it is 
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exactly in such a setting that the story of the victim/survivor is being woven into the narrative 
of the REMHI report. Enquiring further into the nature of this setting I find that it is both as 
Phelps state a kind of ‘dialogic truth’ and a situation, in which the witness, as Ricoeur notes, 
asks to be believed – a request in which the witness often state:“This is what I saw personally in 
those times.”246 (See 3.4 Testimonies – simulacrums of the past?). 
 The act of bearing witness is thus at one and the same time a very fragile setting in 
which the victim/survivor recounts a traumatic past but at the same time it is through this act, 
in which the violence is faced, that a certain notion of power can be thought to surface. The 
truth of the witness is being released from its restraint and merges with others into the narrative 
of the REMHI report – and it is through such a transformation that I will argue, in line with 
Foucault, that this cacophony of truths induces the narrative of the REMHI with a kind of 
power (See 3.3 On the subject of truth and power). 
Consequently, I am arguing that it is through such dynamics that these settings, in which the act 
of bearing witness and with it the gathering of testimonies, can be understood as a 
reproduction in which the stories of violence, as the autonomous narratives they are, are being 
merged into a single narrative – a narrative of violent silence.  
And it is from such an understanding, together with the REMHI’s own statements, that I argue 
that the REMHI project should be understood as a much broader effort that, through its 
narrative, actively opposes what can be described as a persisting syndrome of the conflict in 
Guatemala – not least in form of violence and the impunity that seems to thrive around it. 
 
 
6.3 The collision of impunity  
 
What I want to argue is that the effort of the REMHI actually goes beyond confronting the 
past, and renouncing the atrocities committed, since it is actively seeking to address the 
impunity that is so prevalent in Guatemala and which the REMHI perceives to be both: “... a 
cause and a consequence of violence as well as a central obstacle to justice and reconciliation.”247  
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This impunity is bound to the violence in a co-existence that, although not completely 
dependent on each other, fuels each other as symptoms caused by the conflict. Furthermore, it 
is often this impunity that the witnesses, through their testimonies, are confronting or as it is 
being expressed in the following testimonies:  
 “We never want weapons again, we never want bombardments; no more massacres, no more 
abductions and murders, no more impunity; we don’t want any more corruption.”248  
 “No more weapons. What is needed is the immediate deactivation of the government’s clandestine 
structures. And it is also necessary to bring it before the truth commission, and the eyes of the whole world, so 
that they can be witnesses to what is happening to us…”249 
What is especially interesting in these testimonies is that the violence is presented 
as directly connected to impunity, as being intimately related, and it is from such a stance that I 
am arguing that it is this widespread impunity which, as a consequence of violence as well as a 
cause to further bloodshed, reveals an important dimension of the silence in Guatemala – that 
this silence is violent. And it is from such a standpoint that the REMHI project is confronting:  
1)“The absolute power of military power and police forces [and, Ed.] their frequent clandestine 
activities (...) a state of impunity.” 2)“The ability of perpetrators to commit crimes with impunity...” and 3)“... 
the reality that victims live next door to perpetrators in many communities, and the emergence of new forms of 
social violence...”250 
The REMHI project can therefore be understood as reacting to certain symptoms that, 
although originally caused by the conflict, has been able to hurl its threads deep into the rifts of 
post-conflict Guatemala.  
I have already stated that the REMHI project goes beyond confronting the past, and this I hold 
to be true, in as much as it is understood that the confrontation with the past is also a 
confrontation with the present. Consequently, I argue that the past might be thought of as 
something that grows into the present – and in this regard it could be questioned if I am 
speaking about memory. To which the answer would be yes, but only partially since I find that 
it is memory, coupled with it is organic object, the people of Guatemala, that allows for an 
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understanding of the past as being a part of the present: “The ones who harmed us are alive. They are 
living in the village of Salina Magdalena.”251 
I believe that testimonies such as this one clarifies, at least to some extent, the significance of 
violence and of how the past interferes with the present in Guatemala. And furthermore that it 
is this circumstance which the REMHI project, as a reaction to the testimonies, is addressing: 
 “We hope for greater support to live as human beings. The rights each and every one of us has 
should not be violated (…) I also hope that this is recorded in a document so that the authorities take notice of 
the issue and that the human rights are respected.”252  
It is therefore an endeavour that seeks, by way of constructing a narrative summarising the 
violence of the past, to focus on the deep fissures of conflict that are causing internal 
fragmentation in Guatemala, or as expressed by Bishop Monsignor Juan Gerardi Conedera: “... 
we want to contribute to the construction of a different country.”253 However, the REMHI report does not 
ignore the people that, as strongly expressed by Jean Améry, cannot: “… join in the unisonous peace 
chorus (…) which cheerfully proposes: not backward let us look but forward, to a better, common future!”254 
Instead it actually includes the testimonies in which some victims/survivors are expressing their 
scepticism or even a refusal to forgive:  
“… I am not going to remain silent….This business that I am going to forgive: I forgive when I 
see that some of them are behind bars, let that be perfectly clear. Not here, nor anywhere else, am I going to 
forgive so that everything stays like it is. It’s impossible.”255 
The REMHI is in this way merging the refusal to forgive, and ‘the living on as if nothing had 
happened’, with the objective of reconstruction. And as result the REMHI is at one and the 
same time denouncing the atrocities of the past while emphasising that:  
“... it is also an announcement. It is an alternative aimed at finding new ways for human beings 
to live with one another.”256 
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Pt.1 The Impact of the Violence. Chp.3 p.50 – Case 1368 (Kiché man), Tierra Caliente, Sacapulas, Quiché, 1981.   
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253 Ibid. Pt.1 The Impact of the Violence. Chp.6 p.93 – Case 2155 (forced disappearances), Tactic, Alta Verapaz, 1983. 
253 Ibid. Speech by Monseñor Juan Gerardi. p.xxii 
254 Améry, Jean. At the Mind’s Limit. Bloomington. Indiana University Press. 1980. p 69 
255 Guatemala: Never Again! Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, and London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1999. 
Pt.1 The Impact of the Violence. Chp.6 p.93 – Case 2155 (forced disappearances), Tactic, Alta Verapaz, 1983. 
256 Ibid. Speech by Monseñor Juan Gerardi. p.xxiii 
67 | P a g e  
 
And it is this very statement that underlines the REMHI’s effort as one that tries to bring about 
change in Guatemala – facing the violence while loudly proclaiming: Never Again!  
Consequently, the REMHI turns its attention to the victims/survivors and asks: how to prevent 
the recurrence of violence: 
 “What should be done to keep this from happening again? (...) put fear aside, because fear is 
what most affects us. Because we have allowed ourselves to be silenced by fear; but right now a space is being 
opened for us to speak out. So for me it’s a very important thing that we stop being afraid, because it’s the only 
way to begin to respect each other.”257 
This testimony once again stresses fear as being one of the major concerns of the people and 
by doing so it emphasises the importance of facing this symptom. And thus I ask: Is it not 
possible to think of this fear as being caused by the syndrome of violent silence? However, 
while I have argued that fear is a recurrent symptom in the testimonies it should still be noted 
that other aspects also are recognised as being important:  
 “Thanks to those people who thought to create an authority to defend our values. We should 
support them, understand that they are defending what we had lost (...) Now we have to take into account that 
we all have the same worth, educate our children, give them good advice, good ideas; not like those people were 
raised who got involved in that evil, destructive policy.”258  
Here, the education of children is being emphasised as a way to bring about change, a way to 
oppose violence, and this is an argument that is being repeated in other testimonies e.g.:  
“I hope that all of this is recorded so that the little children of today learn about it some day and 
try to keep it from happening again.”259  
“I hope you will give us a book so that it will remain as history, so that our children will 
understand what we suffered.”260 
It is arguments such as these that seem to presuppose the idea that truth commissions, such as 
the REMHI project, are able to create alternative political spaces, by giving way to the telling of 
stories of violence and by doing so promoting change through the raising of awareness: 
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“To keep this from happening again – I think that things happen by organizing ourselves, by 
raising awareness. That time can return if we don’t understand each other. But if we understand the need we 
have experienced as poor people, as Guatemalans, we think that this will not be the same perhaps.”261  
“This situation should never happen again. I think perhaps based on development, on education 
for us, for all Guatemalan citizens.”262  
What I find particularly interesting in these testimonies is how education, and with it the telling 
of Guatemala’s violent past, is being ascribed a very important role in the effort to steer away 
from the so-called culture of violence. The statements in these testimonies go hand-in-hand 
with some of the REMHI’s own conclusions: 
 “The large number of people deformed by [or educated in] violence through the civil patrols and 
the practice of forced recruitment indicates the danger that militarization will have long time repercussions.” 
which leads the REMHI to state that: “the war’s legacy is already apparent in new forms of social 
violence.”263 
In conclusion, I am arguing that what the REMHI project is opposing is both a past of violence 
as well as it is facing a legacy that:  
“... has led to the consolidation of clandestine networks (...) organized into criminal gangs (...) 
[and that, Ed.] These groups cannot be considered in isolation from traditional power structures, including the 
army.”264 
And it is not least by such statements, together with the already mentioned introductory 
remarks, that I am arguing that the REMHI project moves beyond dealing with the past and is 
turning its attention to the present. An argument which is further strengthened by the following 
statement: 
 “Memory has a clear preventive function. Preventing a recurrence of tragedy is largely dependent 
on dismantling the structures that made such horror possible.”265 
Consequently, memory is here seen as an instrument holding the potential to prevent further 
violence and thus it becomes clear that it is through memory and by gathering testimonies that 
the REMHI is seeking to change structures in Guatemala. 
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The binding together of testimonies into a narrative that presents the violent silence allows the 
REMHI to create a more unison response, not only on the violence that occurred during the 
nearly 36 years of conflict, but also to the persistence of violence. Furthermore, I believe that it 
is of particular interest to notice how the REMHI project is actually trying to stand face-to-face 
with the power structures from which violence has flowed and continues to burst from.  
In this way, the REMHI report is facing the violence by exposing it and it is from such a view, 
that I argue, that these dealings with the past attain a central position, and thus becomes of 
particular value, in regards to how the REMHI project and CEH can be understood as actors. 
The question is thus, if not these bodies of truth should be understood as being more than 
commissions aiming to shed light on the past, less about bringing justice, and instead can be 
thought of as commissions, introduced as instruments in a post-conflict process, which operate 
with the objective to arrive upon a prognosis for the given society. The overall objective thus 
seems to be, to try and analyse the violent past so as to better understand a prevailing syndrome 
and its symptoms in Guatemala. And it is from such a position that I argue, the REMHI 
project can be thought of as a body of alternative power that actively seeks to address and 
oppose past wrongs. Consequently, it is through this effort that the REMHI project can be 
thought of as a central actor in the space of post-conflict state formation in Guatemala.  
 
 
6.4 On the conclusions & recommendations of the CEH  
 
Having arrived upon the abovementioned conclusion I will now turn to the Guatemalan 
Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH). To begin with, I find that the report of the 
CEH, not least due to its role as an integrated part of the Peace Accords, is to be read and dealt 
with in a different way than the REMHI report. This also emphasises the circumstance that the 
work of the CEH, although comparable, is slightly different than that of the REMHI. 
Furthermore, I am of the belief that by focusing upon the conclusions and recommendations 
of the CEH, and the fact that it was officially commissioned, it is possible to bridge the analysis 
of the REMHI together with the following one of the CEH and by doing so arrive upon a 
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understanding that positions the work of these two commissions as central to the process of 
post-conflict reconstruction in Guatemala.   
As a point of departure, I will try and let the following statement, from the prologue of the 
CEH, direct the way into the second part of this analysis:  
“The main purpose of the Report is to place on record Guatemala’s recent, bloody past (...) The 
massacres that eliminated entire Mayan rural communities belong to the same reality as the persecution of the 
urban political opposition, trade union leaders, priests and catechists. These are neither perfidious allegations, nor 
figments of the imagination, but an authentic chapter in Guatemala’s history.”266 
What the CEH is addressing is thus, and in line with the REMHI, the past of violence –
stressing that its findings are to be considered an authentic chapter of Guatemalan history and 
not of mere imagination. I find that this statement is of considerable importance, since it not 
only devotes its attention to the violence of the past but actually binds the very experiences of 
violence together – from the elimination of Mayan communities to the persecution of the 
urban opposition etc. Furthermore, I will argue that the CEH’s rejection of violence as being 
pure imagination underlines another reality – what I have earlier denoted as the conflict of the 
past in the Guatemala (See 3. An analytical framework on dealing with the past). Consequently, I view 
this argument, ‘of the bloody past as being an authentic chapter of Guatemala’s history’, as an 
affirmation of the existence of a conflict regarding the past in Guatemala. And it is this conflict 
that I, throughout the report, have tried to emphasise, since I believe that by understanding the 
past as conflict it is also possible to perceive these commissions as responses aiming to provide 
solutions to resolve conflict, or as the CEH report states: 
 “No one today can be sure that the enormous challenge of reconciliation, through knowledge of the 
truth, can be successfully faced (...) To a great extent, the future of Guatemala depends on the response of the 
State and society (...) We place the CEH’s Report, this Memory of Silence, into the hands of every 
Guatemalan...”267 
Agreeing with this argument I will turn my attention away from the testimonies of violence to 
the conclusions and recommendations that seek to resolve conflict. And by doing so, I hope to 
gain an additional perspective on the nature of these two truth commissions. 
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71 | P a g e  
 
6.5 Conclusions on a bloody past 
 
What is especially noteworthy with the report of the CEH, and as I have already noted (See 4.4 
The genocide argument), is that the commission was able to conclude that the violence carried out 
by agents of the State of Guatemala, in the years 1981-83, was actually acts of genocide against 
the Mayan people.268  
However, as disturbing a conclusion as this is, I will still direct attention to some 
of the other conclusions by the CEH. In this regard, I find it of particular interest to focus on 
how the CEH, in its discussion on the historical roots of the internal armed conflict, points to 
the nature of the State of Guatemala concluding that: 
“... the violence was fundamentally directed by the State against the excluded, the poor and above 
all, the Mayan people...”269 
“The anti-democratic nature of the Guatemalan political tradition has its roots in an economic 
structure, which is marked by the concentration of productive wealth in the hands of a minority.”270 
“Due to its exclusionary nature, the State was incapable of achieving social consensus around a 
national project able to unite the whole population.”271 
  “Political violence was (...) a direct expression of structural violence.”272 
“Impunity permeated the country to such an extent that it took control of the very structure of the 
State and became both a means and an end.”273 
As a result of these statements, I find that the CEH is not only focusing on genocide, although 
these conclusions also serve the genocide argument, but that it is actually focusing on the State 
of Guatemala, and inherent traits in its structure, as being fundamental to the causes of the 
conflict. And it is from such a perspective that I argue the CEH is addressing the past in an 
effort that, as the REMHI project, seeks to promote a process of reconstruction in Guatemala. 
Taking a closer look at the report, it becomes clear that such notions are quite prevalent e.g. as 
it can be seen in CEH’s view of the Mayan movement: 
                                            
268 Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala: Memory of Silence; Report of the Commission for 
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 “... the Mayan people has made important contributions in the area of multiculturality and peace. 
These provide the essential bases for society as a whole to review its history and commit itself to building a new 
project of nationhood consistent with its multiculturality, which should be inclusive, tolerant and proud of the 
wealth implicit in its cultural differences.”274 
It is through statements such as this one that the CEH can be perceived as an actor in the post-
conflict process of Guatemala. Furthermore, I find that this argument is strengthened by the 
CEH’s ability to arrive upon conclusions from which it is commenting upon the challenges that 
lie ahead, or as it is being presented in the following statement: 
  “The immediate key tasks that will facilitate Guatemala’s full transition to reconciliation (…) 
are: furthering the demilitarization process of both the State and society; strengthening the judicial system; 
opening up of greater opportunities for effective participation…”275 
However, as I have already stated, it is a question of status and mandate, and thereby power, 
that determines what a truth commission is able to search for and consequently what it is able 
to state (See 3.1 The work of truth commissions). As a result, I hold it to be clear that to be able to 
put forth such statements, as the ones mentioned above, the CEH had, although it was 
restricted in a number of ways, a mandate that at least allowed the commission to put forth 
conclusions and recommendations by which it was able to point to the weaknesses in the 
structure of the State of Guatemala. Nevertheless, the strength of this mandate can still be 
questioned, not least since it seems that these ‘weaknesses’ in fact constitute, or at least 
constituted, very powerful actors within the structure of the State. Consequently, these actors 
might not be all too willing to accept the findings of the commission and in this regard it is 
worth noting that the CEH, as if having anticipated such a reaction, concludes that: 
 “… the authorities of the Guatemalan State [needs, Ed.] to accept historical responsibility for 
these violations before the Guatemalan people and the international community.”276 And further: 
“To achieve true reconciliation and construct a new democratic and participatory nation which 
values its multiethnic and pluricultural nature, the whole of society must, among other things, assume the 
commitments of the peace processes.”277 
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Taking these statements into consideration, I will turn to the recommendations of the CEH 
with the aim to try and grasp exactly how the CEH is participating in the post-conflict space of 
Guatemala. 
 
 
6.6 Recommendations in an era of post-conflict  
 
In the following, I will try and clarify, by focusing on the recommendations of the CEH, how 
questions on the past merges with the challenges of the present. Thus, what I am arguing is that 
the past, as a consequence of this merger, plays a significant role in the reconstruction process 
of Guatemala.  
To begin with, the CEH states that it was established on the basis of three objectives with one 
of them being to:  
“Formulate specific recommendations to encourage peace and national harmony in Guatemala 
(...) in particular, measures to preserve the memory of the victims, to foster a culture of mutual respect (...) and to 
strengthen the democratic process.”278  
What this allows for is an understanding of the circumstance that one of the underlying 
principles of the CEH was to formulate recommendations and measures that should foster a 
culture of mutual respect etc. by merging the past and present. The CEH states, as the REMHI 
project, that the recommendations are based on the findings of its investigation and that it 
especially reflects the needs and suggestions expressed in the testimonies given to the CEH.279 
And as result it states:  
“The CEH believes it necessary that its recommendations be implemented so that the mandate 
entrusted to it within the framework of the peace process achieves it objectives.”280 
Furthermore, it is from this position that the CEH puts forth its recommendations: 1) 
Measures for the preservation of the memory of the victims; 2) Measures for the compensation 
of the victims; 3) Measures to foster a culture of mutual respect and observance of human 
rights; 4) Measures for strengthening the democratic process; 5) Other recommendations to 
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74 | P a g e  
 
favour peace and national harmony and, 6) Body responsible for promoting and monitoring the 
fulfilment of the recommendations.281  
Moreover, the CEH emphasises that its: “... recommendations are fundamentally designed to facilitate 
unity in Guatemala...” and further: “To bring about a reconstruction of Guatemala’s social fabric (...) it is 
vital to foster an authentic sense of national unity among the diversity of peoples that make up the nation.”282 
And it is through this statement I find it to be clear that the CEH seeks to reconstruct the 
social fabric and facilitate national unity in Guatemala. As a result, I find that the 
recommendation of the CEH, in form of its six measures, actually is a very refined effort trying 
to promote the reconstruction of the Guatemalan society. In this regard I find it to be of 
particular interest to focus on some of the statements and notions put forth by the CEH – 
especially the ones concerning the preservation of the victims’ memory and the fostering of a 
culture of mutual respect. 
In line with the Accord of Oslo, the first set of recommendations situate the memory of 
victims as being a central part of the CEH’s effort to promote reconstruction:  
 “The CEH believes that the historical memory, both individual and collective, forms the basis of 
national identity. Remembrance of the victims is a fundamental aspect of this historical memory and permits the 
recovery of the values of (...) human dignity.”283 
I might already have touched upon this idea, however, I still want to stress, that it is not before 
facing this statement, which presuppose a connection between the past, in form of both 
collective and individual memory, and the notion of national identity, that I find it to be 
absolutely clear how the CEH connects the past with an effort that seeks to strengthen national 
unity. Thus, the remembrance of the victims, as well as the resuming of responsibility for the 
violence, is seen as essential to the efforts of promoting and building a national identity: 
 “... the President [should, Ed.] recognise, before the whole of Guatemalan society (...) those acts 
described in the report, ask pardon for them and assume responsibility for the Human Rights violation connected  
with the internal armed confrontation...”284 
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Additionally, the CEH emphasises that the Guatemalan State and society should commemorate 
the victims by various activities including the designation of a day of commemorating the 
victims, construction of monuments and public parks in memory of victims, assigning of names 
of victims to educational centres and buildings etc. But even more important the CEH stress 
that the: “... commemorations and ceremonies for the victims of the armed confrontation take into consideration 
the multicultural nature of the Guatemalan nation...”285 
It is by measures as these that I believe that the CEH is inscribing the past into the structure of 
Guatemala both physically and politically. However, this seemingly cultural effort does not 
dwell at such junctures but persists in its effort to foster a so-called culture of mutual respect. 
Furthermore, I find that it is through these recommendations, regarding the culture of mutual 
respect, that the CEH is actually providing a clear set of objectives that confronts what the 
report describes as a culture of violence. 
And it is from such a viewpoint that I argue the efforts and views of the CEH and the REMHI 
are of such similarity that I find it possible, not only because they seem to be pursuing related 
strategies and objectives, to understand them as producing or contributing to the same 
narrative – the narrative of violent silence. This argument gains in strength when the following 
statement of the CEH, in which it addresses the violence, is considered: 
 “... a culture of violence has developed in Guatemala (...) This clearly needs to be transformed 
into a culture of tolerance and mutual respect.” And further: “... the knowledge and assimilation of the past, 
the knowledge of the causes and the scope of the uncontrolled violence (...) are essential elements for the 
consolidation of a peaceful future.”286 
I am therefore arguing that it is not least by way of the narrative produced that the CEH, 
although not disregarding its recommendations287, like the REMHI, is trying to provide the 
groundwork on which a culture of peace can be fostered. Thus, it is at one and the same time a 
reconstruction that aims to promote peace, as well as it is a deconstruction of the culture of 
violence, or as the CEH notes: 
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 “... to achieve national harmony and reconciliation, a concerted effort at cultural change is 
required (...) this can only be contemplated through an active policy of education for peace.”288 
And it is from such a viewpoint that I understand the conflict of post-conflict Guatemala and 
why I argue that this conflict is situated around this set of narratives, and with it the violent 
silence, which I believe to be intimately tied to politics. This is an argument that I put forth on 
the basis of what I find to be the all too apparent connection between this effort and politics or 
as it is being described in the following recommendations by the CEH: 
 “32. That the State, as a moral imperative and as a duty, embrace the contents of this Report 
and all initiatives put into effect for its dissemination and promotion among all Guatemalans.” 289 And 
further: “37. That the State (...) co-finance an educational campaign to promote a culture of mutual respect 
and peace (...) based on principles such as democracy, tolerance, respect for human rights and on the use of 
dialogue...”290 
Nevertheless, it still seems possible to question the argument of conflict. Not least because 
there does not seem, at least at first hand, to be any signs of conflict involved with the above 
recommendations. However, the reason why I conclude in the argument that there is a conflict 
in Guatemala, around the narrative of the CEH and the REMHI and the efforts to promote 
reconstruction, is due to the simple question: What happens if the findings in the reports, as I 
believe to be the case in Guatemala, are not accepted and embraced?  
Furthermore, what does this tell about the narrative and how does this affect its position and 
function? And it is from exactly such a position that I will underline the argument, that it is 
possible not only to situate this narrative of violent silence in the middle of a conflict that 
persists to this day, but also that it should be understood that the narrative produced, as a 
product of these two truth commissions, is not only dealing with the past but as much with the 
present. And consequently, I understand the REMHI project and the CEH commission, not 
least through their narrative of violent silence, as actors in a maelstrom of both conflict, 
development and not least politics – as actors intimately involved with questions on power in 
the space of post-conflict state formation in Guatemala.  
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7. Conclusions on the dealings with the past of Guatemala 
 
I began this thesis by describing the ceremony in which the Guatemala: Memory Silence was 
released and it is this scene, together with murder of Bishop Monsignor Juan Gerardi Conedera 
following the presentation of Guatemala: Never Again! which I find portray one of the 
breathtaking realities of post-conflict or should I say so-called post-conflict Guatemala: That 
the findings of the two reports were not accepted by the structure and the actors that they 
opposed. Furthermore, it is in this setting that I find that the research question; How can the two 
truth commissions, the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) and the Recovery of 
Historical Memory project (REMHI), be understood as actors that, through their production of a set of 
narratives, participate in the space of post-conflict state formation in Guatemala?, finds its significance.  
To begin with, this question presuppose post-conflict, and thereby conflict, while 
hinting to the existence of a vacuum, a kind of space, in which questions of state formation are 
put forth and openly contested. And it is this circumstance, together with the abovementioned 
scenarios, that I believe have framed this inquiry on the set narratives created by the two truth 
commissions. The focal point of this inquiry has thus been the set of narratives presented in the 
reports of the REMHI project and to some extent the conclusions and recommendations of 
the CEH.  
By approaching the reports in such a way, I have tried to decipher what it is that lies at the core 
of the two truth commissions, their very nature and character, and by doing so, I have closed in 
on the set of narratives found in the reports. In this regard, I have found that the notion of 
silence is as central to the testimonies as the violence they describe. Arriving upon this 
conclusion, I have questioned if not violence and silence can be thought to be related – if not 
this silence and violence could be seen as being connected to each other in a kind of two-sided 
relationship: If not this silence actually is a form of violence – that violence is taking on a 
character of silence, hence, the notion of violent silence.  
By identifying this notion of violent silence, which I hold to be a syndrome of the conflict in 
Guatemala, as being the central notion in the set of narratives produced by the REMHI and the 
CEH, it became clear that it is this syndrome which the REMHI project and the CEH are 
opposing through the exposure of its existence. As a consequence, I have found that at the core 
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of the two truth commissions, and their set of narratives, is the aim to expose the violence and 
its dominance in Guatemala. Therefore, I find that the violent silence is both a notion, as well 
as characteristic of the REMHI and CEH reports. However, I also believe that this violent 
silence is a very real and continuous matter – a syndrome that depicts at least one of the sites of 
conflict in Guatemala.291  
Furthermore, I argue that it is through this effort, which aims to expose the 
violent silence that the REMHI and the CEH are entering into the space of post-conflict state 
formation in Guatemala. Consequently, I hold that the REMHI and CEH, as bodies of 
alternative power, are actors in this space in which they are struggling with other power 
structures, or to be more precise: I am of the conviction that the narration of this violent 
silence can be understood as an effort that tries to oppose another regime of truth, the one of 
the State of Guatemala, by the very construction, and thus the attempted deconstruction of the 
opposed system of power, of another set of truths. I am therefore arguing that the narration of 
the violent silence not only tell of a prevalent syndrome of the conflict in Guatemala but 
actually is a very complex, although contested, effort that tries to promote a certain vision of 
development and state formation in so-called post-conflict Guatemala. 
Arriving upon this conclusion, I find that a final question which must be 
considered concerns the testimonies of violence. In this regard, it is clear that these individual 
recollections are undoubtedly the very body, and strength, of the two truth commissions. 
However, what I want to stress is that these testimonies, due to their individual nature, also 
seem to be the greatest weakness of the REMHI and the CEH – the very reason as to why their 
reports can be rejected as being biased, or as one army major, teaching at the Adolfo Hall 
Civic-Military Institute in Guatemala City, has stated:  
“”there isn’t any documentation of the war, there isn’t a book about the war.”” Adding: 
“”Well there is the Church’s book (...) but that is biased. The Clarification Commission’s report is biased too 
(...) isn’t in the curriculum standard of the Ministry of Education, so we’re not reading it.””292  
                                            
291 Indeed there seems to be several see e.g. Stepputat, Finn. Chapter 9: “Insecurity, State, and Impunity in Latin America” 
in Andersen, Louise. Møller, Bjørn and Stepputat, Finn. Fragile States and Insecure People? – Violence, Security, and 
Statehood in the Twenty-First Century. New York. Palgrave Macmillan. 2007. p. 201-223. 
292 Oglesby, Elizabeth. Educating Citizens in Postwar Guatemala. Radical History Review. Truth Commissions: State Terror, 
History and Memory. Issue 97, Winter 2007, pp.77-98. p.87 
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Confronted with these statements that point to but one of the reasons why conflict continues 
in Guatemala, it could be questioned whether the work of the CEH and REMHI project was 
carried out all in vain? I do not believe that there is a single answer to this question; however, I 
will state that I hold the abovementioned statement to be quite illustrative of the continuity of 
the violent silence in Guatemala – a syndrome which might never have been heard of, 
presented or even spoken about if not for Guatemala: Memory of Silence and Guatemala: Never 
Again!.  
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Epilogue – Guatemala now 
  
On 25th of February 2009, the day of the 10th anniversary of the CEH report Guatemala: Memory 
of Silence, the President of Guatemala Alvaro Colom did what former President Alvaro Arzú 
never achieved in 1999: He apologised to the 18.000 people that had gathered for the 
anniversary and the Dignity Day for Victims in Guatemala City:  
“”Today is a day to commemorate our victims. Today is a good day to tell all the relatives of 
victims of the armed conflict as President of the Republic, as Head of State, and as Commanding General of the 
Army that I ask forgiveness.”” and further: “”This day of commemoration of the victims is also a day to start 
a strong organization to achieve a more united Guatemala (...) and that this tragic, murderous, perverse, bloody, 
evil history will never again be repeated.””293 
In the light of this statement, Michael Itzep, Coordinator of the National Movement of 
Victims, has stated that with the new administration he has finally seen a government with the 
political will to compensate those affected by violence.294 However, the words of Colom are as 
promising as they are frustrating – in Guatemala, violence and impunity are still widespread or 
as one report state: “... Guatemala’s own investigative authorities and judicial system lack credibility. Indeed, 
only 2% of crimes are ever solved.”295 Furthermore, Sergio Morales, the Human Rights Ombudsman 
of Guatemala, has stated in an interview that: 
““It’s very probable that the year will close with more than 1,000 murders” beyond the 6,292 
that occurred last year...”” adding: ““It’s terrible that we have to announce that 2009 is going to exceed the 
most violent year, which according to statistics was 2008,””296 
 In addition to this, an observer on the conflict in Guatemala has said that: “Books 
ends; history does not.”297 However, in the case of Guatemala not only history continues – violence 
                                            
293 The Guatemala Times. “Anniversary of Guatemala’s Memory of Silence and Day of Dignity for the Victims”. February 
25th 2009. See http://www.guatemala-times.com/news/guatemala/838-anniversary-of-guatemalas-memory-of-silence-and-
day-of-dignity-for-the-victims.html 
294 Ibid. 
295The Economist Intelligence Unit. “Guatemalan politics: Crisis slams the government”. The Economist Intelligence Unit. 
May 18th 2009.  
http://viewswire.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&article_id=184518603&country_id=560000056&page_title=
Latest+analysis&rf=0 
296 Latin American Herald. “Murders up 15 percent in Guatemala”. June 1st 2009. See 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=23558&ArticleId=336267 
297 Grandin, Greg. The Blood of Guatemala – A History of Race and Nation. Durham & London. Duke Univeristy Press. 
2000. 
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does as well, and the fact is that nothing seems to indicate that the violence in Guatemala 
belongs to past. Thus the question is if not violence and impunity has taken on a new 
disturbing character?  
Furthermore, President Alvaro Colom has recently been accused of being implicated in the 
murder of the lawyer Rodrigo Rosenberg on May 10th 2009. In a posthumous broadcast, 
Rosenberg accused President Colom of ordering his death.298 This strange case has succeeded 
in raising precedence for the political opposition to demand that President Colom steps down. 
Amongst the population this political tension did not go unnoticed and soon both supporters 
and opponents of the Guatemalan president aired their views in the nation’s streets.299  
Whether President Colom was implicated in the murder or if other actors such as clandestine 
networks or even political opponents, as Colom is claiming, are pulling threads behind this 
bloody drapery remains unclear for the moment. Still this case testifies to the current state of 
affairs in Guatemala a country in which violence still has the upper hand. 
Besides dealing with violence, Guatemala is still not free of its brutal past. In 
Spain, in 1999, the Rigoberta Menchú Tum foundation filed a case against eight senior 
Guatemalan officials including: former heads of state Efraín Ríos Montt, Fernando Romeo 
Lucas García and Óscar Humberto Mejía Victores, ex-Minister of Defence Ángel Anibal 
Guevara Rodríguez, former Minister of Interior Donaldo Álvarez Ruiz, ex-Chief of the Armed 
Forces General Staff Manuel Benedicto Lucas García, former Director of National Police 
Germán Chupina Barahona and head of the police unit Comando Seis, Pedro García 
Arredondo.300 These former officials were charged of having committed terrorism, genocide 
and systematic torture.301 The case, which was first taken on by the renowned Judge Baltasar 
Garzón, is still being processed by the Spanish National Court, however, Ríos Montt is 
currently protected against extradition due to his seat in the Congress of Guatemala. 
Furthermore, in December 2007 the Guatemalan Courts issued a decision stating that the arrest 
and extradition requests, of Pedro García Arredondo and Ángel Anibal Guevara Rodríguez, 
                                            
298 The Economist Intelligence Unit. “Guatemalan politics: Crisis slams the government”. May 18th 2009.  
http://viewswire.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&article_id=184518603&country_id=560000056&page_title=
Latest+analysis&rf=0 
299 The New York Times. Guatemala – Update May 22nd 2009. 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/guatemala/index.html 
300 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/guatemala/genocide/round1.htm 
301 http://www.cja.org/cases/guatemala.shtml 
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issued by the Spanish National Court were invalid.302 This ruling resulted in strained diplomatic 
relations between the two countries and in January 2008, Judge Santiago Pedraz issued a ruling 
that denounced the lack of cooperation by the Guatemalan authorities – the case continued to 
run throughout 2008.303   
Nevertheless, small lights of hope appear in this dark – not least the UN-
supported Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG, International 
Commission against Impunity in Guatemala) which began operating in January 2008. One of 
the CICIG’s primary objectives was: “To support, strengthen and assist institutions of the State of 
Guatemala responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes allegedly committed in connection with the 
activities of illegal security forces and clandestine organizations…”304  
For the moment, it seems that the CICIG have achieved positive results e.g. the arrest of 
Enrique Ríos Sosa, son of retired General Efraín Ríos Montt, who served as the army’s 
financial director during the rule of former President Alfonso Portillo – Ríos Sosa is accused of 
embezzlement and ideological falsehood.305 However, the CICIG’s and the Human Rights 
Ombudsman Sergios Morales’ results have also caused negative responses, not least in form of 
a resurgence in death threats against human rights activists306 - the kidnapping and torturing of 
lawyer and politician Gladys Monterroso, which is also the wife of Sergio Morales, serving as 
distressing examples.307 Only time will tell if the CICIG, that, with the approval of UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, has had its mission extended for two years,308 together with 
other efforts has the sufficient strength to confront the impunity and a violence that appear to 
be as strong as ever. 
                                            
302 See http://www.cja.org/cases/guatemala.shtml 
303 Ibid. 
304 See http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/061215-hrd-digned-english-agreement-cicig.pdf 
305 The Guatemala Times. “Spectacular captures through Guatemala's Public Ministry's Special Prosecution for CICIG”. 
March 26th 2009 See http://www.guatemala-times.com/news/guatemala/960-spectacular-captures-through-guatemalas-
public-ministrys-special-prosecution-for-cicig.html 
306 The Guatemala Times. “Guatemalan Human Rights activists face death threats again”. May 5th 2009. 
See http://www.guatemala-times.com/news/guatemala/1090-guatemalan-human-rights-activists-face-death-threats-
again.html 
307 The Guatemala Times. “Wife of Guatemala's human rights ombudsman kidnapped”. March 26th 2009. See 
http://www.guatemala-times.com/news/guatemala/961-wife-of-guatemalas-human-rights-ombudsman-kidnapped.html 
308 The Guatemala Times. “International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, CICIG, extends mission for two 
years”. April 22nd 2009. See http://www.guatemala-times.com/news/guatemala/1039--international-commission-against-
impunity-in-guatemala-cicig-extends-mission-for-two-years.html 
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Chart 1:  Agreements signed as a part of the Peace Process in Guatemala 1987-96. 
 
1987: 
 The Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America 
(The 'Esquipulas II' Accord) is signed in Guatemala City by the five Central American 
presidents on 7th of August 1987. 
1990: 
 The Basic Agreement on the Search for Peace by Political Means (the 'Oslo Accord'), 
signed by the URNG and the CNR on 30th of March, 1990. 
1991: 
 The Agreement on the Procedure for the Search for Peace by Political Means, also 
known as the “Mexico Accord”, signed on 26th of April, 1991.  
 The Framework Agreement on Democratization in the Search for Peace by Political 
Means, the Querétaro Agreement, signed on 25th of July, 1991. 
1994: 
 The Framework Agreement for the Resumption of Negotiations between the 
Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity. Signed 
in Mexico City – on 10th of January, 1994. 
 The Agreement on a Timetable for Negotiations on a Firm and Lasting Peace in 
Guatemala. Signed in Mexico City – on 29th of March, 1994. 
 The Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights. Signed in Mexico City – on 29th of 
March, 1994. 
 The Agreement on the Resettlement of Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed 
Conflict. Signed in Oslo – on 17th of June, 1994.  
 The Agreement for the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights 
Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer.  
Signed in Oslo, on 23rd of June, 1994. 
1995: 
 The Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Signed on 31st of 
March, 1995. 
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1996: 
 The Agreement on Socio-economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation. Signed in 
Mexico City – on 6th of May, 1996. 
 The Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed 
Forces in a Democratic Society. Signed in Mexico City – on 19th of September, 1996. 
 The Agreement on a Definitive Ceasefire. Signed in Oslo – on 4th of December, 1996. 
 The Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime.  Signed in 
Stockholm – on 7th of December, 1996. 
 The Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the URNG. Signed in Madrid 
– on 12th of December, 1996. 
 The Law of National Reconciliation. Signed on 18th of December, 1996. 
 The Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the 
Peace Agreements. Signed in Guatemala City – on 29th of December, 1996. 
 The Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace. Signed in Guatemala City – on 29th of 
December, 1996.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
